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As a formal institution, agricultural extensionl is quite young worldwide (Rivera
1991a). Organized informally in the 19th century in several industrializing countries
around the world, it was not until the end of that century that its function became
formalized within public institutions, usually ministries or departments of agriculture.
In the past 100 years, most countries in the world have established some type of
agricultural extension system. A very important reason for the establishment of
agricultural extension systems was the emphasis at that time on agricultural growth.
Agricultural extension systems were seen as a way to promote this growth and to enhance
the use of modern inputs in support of import substitution and industrialization policies
(Rivera 1991a). Also, the significant accumulation of research information that could
boost the development of agriculture, created the need for the dissemination of such
information. The developments in mass media communications and transportation were
lAccording to World Bank (World Bank 1990) "Extension sits at the center of the
agricultural information network. It is the component of the system that focuses on
information transfer itself. As such, it is the agricultural information network's
representative to farmers - and the farmer's representative and advocate to the system.
While its basic function is to enhance the capacity of farm families to deal with their
problems and to meet new opportunities, its major task is information transfer to improve
agriculture. "
According to FAO (FAO 1987a) "Extension is a service or system which assists
farm people, through educational processes and procedures, to improve farm methods
and techniques, and increase production efficiency and income. "
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seen as means to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of agricultural extensjon
systems.
Agricultural extension's historic role in the dissemination of information is well
known. However, agricultural extension has evolved differently in different countries,.
for example from a farm advisory and home economics service to a broad-based
nonformal education system in the United States, and from a community development
approach to an information transfer system in India. The evolution of agricultural
extension in developing countries over recent decades illustrates some of the varying
goals that have been adopted and methodologies that have been tried. From an initial
concentration on commodity crops in the 1950s and early 1960s, the global focus of
development assistance for agricultural extension turned to poverty alleviation in the
1970s. Concerns with increasing the productivity of women and preserving the ecology
were added in the 1980s, along with a contradictory preoccupation with limiting the
public financial burdens of agricultural extension that has led to cost-recovery and
privatization schemes (World Bank 1990). According to the Global Consultation on
Agricultural Extension, when agricultural extension is viewed as a publicly supported
instrument or mechanism of agricultural and rural development, there are two main
schools of thought regarding its purpose. The first considers public expenditure on
agricultural extension as an economic investment concerned mostly with technology
transfer to increase agricultural productivity. The second views agricultural extension
as a social investment that is designed to fulfill the needs of the economically
disadvantaged population, specifically small and subsistence farmers. Experience
2
suggests that agricultural extension can and has contributed significantly to both economi.c
growth and human resource development in the agricultural sector.
Agricultural Extension in the Present Situation
This section provides an overall picture of the present situation of the agricultural
extension worldwide. The level of financial and human resources invested in agricultural
extension, and ways to deal with the lack of these resources are presented. Challenges
faced by agricultural extension and ways to deal with these challenges are also presented.
Level of Human and Financial Resources
According to a FAD survey (FAD 1990) in 1988, it is estimated that more than
US$ 6 billion were invested in public agricultural extension worldwide with an average
of about US$ 8,500 per agricultural extension worker. Expressed in terms of the
expenditure per farmer, it ranges from US$ 2-3 in low-income countries (such as most
of the countries in Africa, Latin America and Asia), to US$ 65 in high-income countries
(such as Western European countries, the United States of America, Canada, etc.). Also
the government investment in agricultural extension varies depending on the percentage
of population employed in agriculture. In countries where less than 20 % of population
is employed in agriculture, the government resources for agricultural extension make-up
only about 2.3% of ministry of agriculture resources. In countries with more than 60%
of population employed in agriculture, more than 20 % of ministry of agriculture
resources were allocated to agricultural extension.
3
Regarding the human resour:ces for agricultural extension, it is estimated that there
are more than 600,000 agricultural. extension personnel worldwide, 95 % of which are
working in public agricultural extension systems (FAO 1990). The coverage level of
agricultural extension (percentage of farmers reached by agricultural extension),
measured by agricultural extension agent to farmer ratio, varies between different
countries and regions of the world. The worldwide average is about 1 agricultural
extension agent for every 2,000 people involved in production agriculture. Lower
income countries have lower ratios ranging from 1: 1,800 to 1: 3,000, while the developed
countries have ratios averaging about 1:400. In addition, the ratios for the developed
countries include only agricultural extension personnel working in the public sector. The
number of agricultural extension personnel working in the private sector in those
countries is estimated to exceed that of the public sector.
These levels of financial and human resources allocated for agricultural extension
worldwide are expected to serve the needs of 1. 1 bilJion people economically active in
agriculture, or 22 % of the world's population (FAO 1990). According to Swanson,
Farner, and Bahal, the public sector agricultural extension organizations allocate about
58 % of their resources to serve the needs of larger scale, more progressive, commercial
farmers. Also, the private sector firms concentrate their resources on the needs of
commercial farmers, who can pay for the purchased inputs. As a result, only about one-
third of agricultural extension's resources are used to serve the needs of the small and
subsistence farmers who make-up more than 75-80% of the world's farmers.
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Governments, departments of agriculture, and agricultural extension organizations
in different countries have tried to resolve the problem of lack of resources by: 1)
attempting to increase national agricultural extension budgets; 2) improving management
of available resources; 3) using external assistance; and 4) using investment funds for
agricultural extension. However, despite these efforts the investment and resource
allocation for agricultural extension is still insufficient.
Based on the above information, and also considering investments in agricultural
research and extension tend to yield high returns (Ruttan 1982, 1984; Evenson; Rnd
Birkhauser, Evenson, and Feder) an important controversy exists. On one hand, higher
level of investments in both financial and human resources for agricultural extension
made by the public sector will help increase the coverage level of agricultural extension.
This is based on the consideration of the public sector agricultural extension as an
investment in national wealth creation, including the development of human resources in
rural areas. Public agricultural extension systems contribute directly to increased
agricultural gross domestic product and national income, to sustained agricultural
development, and to increased food security. Despite this evidence, many governments
attempt to reduce public investment in agricultural extension.
Challenges Faced by Agricultural Extension
The previous section outlines the need for higher public investment in agricultural
extension. In fact, this is an internally recognized need, a need recognized by the leaders
of agricultural extension organizations as well as other people within these organizations.
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Viewing it in a broader macroeconomic picture, the global evolution of agricultural
extension is at a critical turning point; an era of uncertainty and change where three
main developments confront agricultural extension internationally (World Bank 1990) ..
The ftrst of these developments is related to the attacks on public sector agricultural
extension by politicians and economists concerned with the costs and financing of public
sector agricultural extension (Rivera and Gustafson). Public sector agricultural extension
worldwide is criticized for not doing enough, not doing it well, and for not being
relevant. Agricultural extension is criticized for lack of effectiveness, efficiency, and for
not pursuing programs that foster equity. Secondly, even though differing cultural,
social, and economic characteristics; institutional relationships; research base; and
sources of financing have resulted in an array of approaches for agricultural extension
internationally, system "model" preference continues to constitute a major controversy.
For example, discussion centers on the adaptability of the U.S. Cooperative Extension
System as a model for developing countries, or the choice of the World Bank's Training
and Visit Extension Management Model as the right choice. Finally, the third
development involves lessons learned, both from the evolution of national agricultural
extension systems and from agricultural extension models and projects developed by
international agencies. Examples include national models as the Taiwanese Farming
Information Dissemination System, the Israeli SHAHAM (Extension and Professional
Service), the U.S. Cooperative Extension System, and projects of several international
agencies Iike the World Bank, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations (FAD), the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the Inter-
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American Institute for Cooperation in Agriculture (I1CA), the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID), the Canadian and Swedish international
development agencies (CIDA and SIDA), and the Norwegian Development Cooperation
entity (NORAD) (Rivera 1991a).
Agricultural extension's institutional evolution is in part a reflection of what is
occurring in other institutional areas. New political agendas, increased cost-awareness
and budgetary restraints, and major technical advances are contributing to significant
changes such as 1) the reduction of public sector services, 2) experimentation with new
service delivery structures, including growing interest in privatization, and 3)
decentralization of activities and shared responsibilities between central and local
governments, and private user associations. There is a strong global thrust toward
increased attention to market forces and a reduction in publ ic sector dominance in areas
it traditionally controlled.
Meanwhile, there is an increased awareness about the mixed economic nature of
agricultural extension se.rvices. There are several classifications of those services ranging
from services with "pure publ ic good" to "pure private good" characteristics and several
intermediate categories with public/private good mixed characteristics. Van Blarcom,
Knudsen, and Nash state that there are a large number of agricultural extension services
currently provided by the governments which have little public good component. Further
they add that privatization of such services can make a major contribution to expenditure
reduction or redirection.
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Ways to Deal with the Challenges Faced by Agricultural Extension
In dealing with challenges faced by agricultural extension as an institution
worldwide, different systems have responded in different ways. Some of the public
agricultural extension systems in Latin American countries like Mexico, Chile,
Venezuela, Colombia, and Argentina moved toward cost-recovery schemes. The move
toward cost-recovery serves two purposes. First, the implementation of fees for some
of the services offered by the public agricultural extension systems is expected to help
with the budget constraint faced by agricultural extension by recovering part of the cost
for providing these services. Second, the introduction of a fee-for-service system is
expected to serve as an incentive for the development of a private consulting market for
agricultural extension services. In other words, by introducing the fees for some services
the farmers will be familiarized with the idea of fee-for-services offered by the private
consulting firms. Also, the introduction of fees reduces the cost differences between
publicly provided and privately provided services.
Another way of dealing with the new challenges in agricultural extension is the
commercialization of the public agricultural extension organizations. This procedure was
followed at a national level in New Zealand and at a regional level in Australia. In the
case of commercialization, public agricultural extension organizations are expected to "go
commercial n, which means that the cost of providing their services to the potential users
should be covered in full by the revenues collected by these users. Expressed in other
words, the commercialization of public agricultural extension is the change from
providing a free public service financed by government to a commercial operation
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financed by user charges (Hercus). In addition, the move toward commercialization is
considered as the first step in the direction of the final objective, the privatization of the
public agricultural extension systems.
In other countries like the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, and Ireland,
a more direct move toward the privatization of the public agricultural extension systems
is being followed. The purpose of the privatization movement is the transfer of the
agricultural extension services from the public sector to the private sector.
The response of the United States Cooperative Extension System (U.S. CES), to
the current challenges has been quite different compared to the ways described above.
The U.S. CES re-grouped, reviewed what was needed, and advanced a new set of issues-
oriented initiatives designed to revitalize the relevance of the system (Rivera 1991a).
The reasoning behind the adjustment of the system to the new realities rather than
attempt to build entirely new structures, as Gustafson argues, is the tremendous difficulty
in developing and institutionalizing public agencies.
Problem Statement
The previous section described different ways of dealing with the new challenges
to agricultural extension. This research will investigate the implementation of alternative
ways of financing agricultural extension including cost-recovery schemes,
commercialization, and privatization and their implications related to the extent and type
of clientele reached, type of services offered, and fees charged for those services. For
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the purpose of this research, farmers (the agricultural extension clientele) are classified
in three different categories (small, medium, and large).
The research question is "how does the move toward the cost-recovery schemes,
commercialization, or privatization affect the extent and type of clientele reached by
agricultural extension?" Does the means of financing affect the coverage level of the
agricultural extension? Will the needs of the small farmers be filled by a commercial or
private agricultural extension organization? What happens to the farmers that cannot
afford to pay fees charged for the available services?
Concerning the changes in the services provided by the agricultural extension
organizations, the biggest change will be expected under the scenarios of
commercialization and privatization. The question here becomes, what will happen to
the "public good" part of agricultural information? Who will be responsible for its
dissem ination?
Another aspect of investigation is related to the fees charged for the services
offered. What effect will the introduction of fees have on the coverage level of
agricultural extension? How will it affect the different categories of farmers? How will
the type of services that farmers require by agricultural extension service change when
they have to pay for them?
Based on the above discussion the objectives of th.is study were formulated. A
general objective and several specific objectives are:
The general objective of this study is to determine the changes in the clientele
reached, services provided, and fees charged for these services as publicly financed
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agricultural extension organizations are changed to be cost-recovery, commercialized, or
privatized. The specific objectives are to:
1. Identify changes in the clientele reached by agricultural extension organizations
as the implementation of the cost-recovery, commercialization, or privatization approach
takes place.
2. Identify changes in the services provided by agricultural extension
organizations following the move toward cost-recovery, commercialization, or
privatization approaches.
3. Identify the effect of cost-recovery, commercialization, and privatization in the
private market for agricultural extension services.
Thesis Organization
Chapter 1 discussed the current situation of agricultural extension worldwide,
challenges faced by agricultural extension and ways of dealing with these challenges.
Also, areas of research to be investigated by this research were identified.
Chapter 2 reviews the existing literature concerning the issues involving cost-
recovery, commercialization, and privatization of public agricultural extension. The
chapter identifies different public and private providers of agricultural extension services
and the factors that affect the demand for and supply of public and private agricultural
extension services. The chapter also identifies different policy strategies used by
governments with regard to decentralization of the public agricultural extension. In
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addition, the chapter describes different country situations where cost-recovery,
commercialization, and privatization approaches are implemented.
Chapter 3 discusses the theory that will be used to analyze the situations where
cost recovery, privatization, and commercialization approaches are implemented. These
situations will be analyzed from the perspective of both neoclassical and institutional
economics. The neoclassical analysis discusses the classification of public and private
goods and services, the role of agricultural information as a competitive tool, and the
structure and the performance of the market for agricultural extension services. The
analysis from the perspective of institutional economics discusses the role of institutions
and the transaction costs in the economic development of a society. In addition, the role
of the public sector in affecting the decisions regarding resource allocation in an economy
is examined. In this context, the role of the public sector in the specific situation of the
cost recovery, commercialization or privatization of agricultural extension is explored.
Finally, the hypotheses for this research are stated.
Chapter 4 describes the methodology that will be used to analyze the implications
of the cost-recovery schemes, commercialization, and privatization approaches concerning
public agricultural extension. The chapter starts with an explanation of the case study
research. The chapter also describes the organization of the questionnaire, the indicators
for which information will be collected, and how the collected information will be used.
Finally, the sources of the information are discussed.
Chapter 5 states the results of the research. The results of the analysis of the
information that was collected with the questionnaire are discussed. First, information
12
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collected for each country case is presented. Then, each country case is analyzed based
on the hypotheses stated in Chapter 3.
Chapter 6 provides conclusions drawn from this research. The research problem
is reviewed in the chapter. Then, conclusions for each of the scenarios investigated in
this research, cost recovery, commercialization, and privatization, are developed from





This chapter reviews literature concerning the issues involving cost-recovery,
commercialization, and privatization of public agricultural extension. The chapter starts
with a description of different public and private providers of agricultural extension
services. The demand for and supply of public and private agricultural extension
services, as well as the factors that influence them, are summarized. In this context, the
role of the private sector in providing agricultural extension services is discussed.
The chapter also identifies different policy strategies followed by governments
with regard to decentralization of the public agricultural extension. In addition, different
public-private funding combinations for agricultural extension are described. Those
combinations include cost-recovery, commercialization, and privatization approaches.
The implementation process and the present situation of agricultural extension
organizations in countries that have followed the above approaches is presented. Finally
the institutional aspects concerning the approaches noted above are reviewed. In relation
to this, the rationale for public funding for agricultural extension programs is discussed.
Ways to Cope with the Lack of Resources for Agricultural Extension
Maalouf, Contado, and Adhikarya note the inconsistent funding for agricultural
extension and the need to resolve the problem of limited resources for agricultural
14
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extension and their distribution. According to them, different ways to resolve this
problem include: 1) attempts to increase national agricultural extension budgets; 2)
improving management of available resources; 3) external assistance; and 4) using
investment funds for agricultural extension.
One of the most common approaches in dealing with the lack of resources for
agricultural extension has been the effort to increase the budget allocations for this
purpose (Maalouf et al.). Some of the factors that affect the agricultural extension
budget are the priority given to agriculture, the percentage of the labor force employed
in agriculture, and national policy regarding the farmers' contribution to food and
agriculture production in the economy. But, as LeGouis notes, "in most countries, the
relative share of national resources earmarked for agriculture extension has been steadily
decreasing". The U.S. Cooperative Extension System with its multi-level government
financing, faces severe budgetary pressures (McDowell; Bonnen). The FAO Report
(1990) shows that central government investment in the agricultural sector decl ined
worldwide between 1975 and 1985. Also, the proportion of agricultural extension
expenditures in the Agricultural Gross Domestic Product declined worldwide from 0.96
percent in 1980 to 0.90 percent in 1988.
Improved management of available resources is another approach to solving the
problem of inadequate funding for agricultural extension (Maalouf et al. 1991). As
Evenson states, well-managed agricultural extension systems that have adequate and
stable levels of funding can yield high rates of return. One way of improving the
management of existing resources is by removing the non-extension functions (such as
15
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regulatory and information collection functions) of the agricultural extension agents,
which worldwide count for about 26% of public agricultural extension time and
resources. In addition, the creation of a functional linkages between agricultural research
and extension can facilitate the transfer of technology from agricultural research to
agricultural extension and may reduce agricultural extension costs by reducing the
number of subject matter specialists (SMS)2. Another way of improving the
management of existing resources followed by several countries (Bangladesh, Nigeria,
Philippines, etc.) is the move toward decentralization - the reduction and transfer of
management responsibility and along with it, the resources - from the central to the local
level of government. The constraints here rest in the reluctance of the agricultural
extension agents and managers to change existing work practices and on the lack of
support of administration to change.
External assistance for developing countries in the form of bilateral or multilateral
technical assistance helps in increasing the agricultural extension coverage level (Maalouf
et a1.). But the problem is that in many cases the coverage level is not maintained after
the external assistance is completed.
Finally, to increase the resources for agricultural extension, many governments
are using loan funds for this purpose (Maalouf et al.). The World Bank's lending for
2However, according to Sawnson, Farner, and Bahal, "The success of an extension
system in technology transfer is directly influenced by the proportion and quality of
SMSs". In addition, according to Sawnson, Sands, and Peterson, it appears that a
functionally effective SMS to extension agent ratio would be approximately 1 to 4-5. A
FAO survey (FAO 1990) showed that most of the countries have a wider ratio than 1:4-
5, with the worldwide ratio being 1:11.5.
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agricultural extension, as the largest source of such funds, has steadily increased, and in
proportion with increased lending for agriculture in general (an average 4.2 percent of
total agricultural lending) (Hayward 1990). The continuation of this way of funding will
depend on the cost-effectiveness and economic sustainability of agricultural extension
systems financed through these loans.
Maalouf, Contado, and Adhikarya conclude: "given the coverage level problem
of agricultural extension and despite the different initiatives to resolve the inadequate
resource problems mentioned above, two conclusions can be drawn: the investment and
resource allocation for agricultural extension is still insufficient; and resource allocation
for public-sector agricultural extension are unlikely to increase significantly in the near
future" . Alternative ways and resources should be identified to support agricultural
extension to reach the majority of small and resource-poor farmers.
Policy Strategies Regarding the Decentralization of Agricultural Extension
Agricultural extension is in transition worldwide. Governments and international
agencies are advancing structural, financial and managerial strategies to reform
agricultural extension. According to Rivera (1996a), there are three main directions of
the decentralization policy: 1) decentralizing through fiscal system redesign; 2)
decentralizing the government responsibility for agricultural extension through structural
reform; and 3) decentralizing through farmer participation in decision making and their
taking responsibility for agricultural extension programs.
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Decentral ization through fiscal system redesign aims either to recover costs or to
promote cost-sharing. Cost-recovery is generally sought through direct charging to
farmers or farmer organizations, and cost-sharing is promoted through joint arrangements
with farmer associations or private entities (Rivera and Elkalla). Direct charging is
increasing especially in OECD member countries. Over half of those countries receive
at least 20 % of their finances from direct charging. Finland and Norway receive more
than 50% from users. Other countries like Mexico have developed fee-based systems,
especially for large-scale farmers (Wilson 1991). In Chile the government established
voucher schemes, where farmers are provided vouchers they can use for receiving
services from the private agricultural extension consultants (Wilson 1991). Cost-sharing
with subgovernment (non-federal governmental units) is the form of fiscal redesign
prevalent in federally constituted countries, such as the United States, Canada and India
(Shah 1994).
Decentralization through structural reform includes deconcentration, devolution,
delegation, and transfer of responsibility to the private sector for agricultural extension.
Deconcentration is defined as the transfer of effective control by central government
agencies to their field level offices or regional centers (Rivera 1996a). Devolution means
that effective control is transferred to subnational governments in federally constituted
countries (Rivera 1996a). In the case of delegation, a subnational government or
parastatal (such as commodity boards) acts as an agent of the central government in the
implementation of the agricultural extension functions. The transfer of responsibility for
agricultural extension to the private sector includes strategies toward privatization as well
18
as utilization of the services of third sectors like non governmental organizations (NOOs).
In New Zealand, agricultural extension were first commercialized before being
privatized.
Decentralization through farmer participation means involving user/clients, in this
case farmers, in program development processes such as diagnosis of needs as well as
program goal setting, design, and implementation (Rivera, Elshafie, and Aboul-Seoud,
forthcoming). The reasoning is that efficiency is fostered by encouraging and using local
people and their expertise (Schiavo-Campo). The agricultural extension function is not
merely to transfer technology but to ensure effective two-way flow of information, with
the aim of empowering farmers through knowledge rather than issuing technical
prescriptions (Antholt). Advantages of using local expertise are capacity building, cost
effectiveness, and greater familiarity with the local context (Zijp).
The Need for Public-Private Agricultural Extension Cooperation
Maalouf, Contado, and Adhikarya investigated the need for public-private
agricultural extension cooperation. According to their results: "the challenge to
agricultural extension policy and decision-makers is that of large numbers of farmers
needing agricultural extension services and limited public funds to provide needed
agricultural extension help".
Data from a FAO Report (1990) indicate that, in Africa two out of three farmers
have no contact with public agricultural extension; in Asia three out of four; in Latin
America six out of seven, and in the Near East five out of six. In addition, the agent-
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farmer ratios worldwide are largely inadequate. Based on the FAO study, these ratios
are: 1:325 for North America and 1:431 for Europe, but 1: 1809 for Africa, 1:2661 for
Asia, 1:2940 for Latin America, and 1:3499 for the Near East.
One way to increase agricultural extension coverage level has been the
establishment or re-establishment of more agricultural extension organizations.
According to a FAO survey (l987b) of 207 agricultural extension organizations in 115
countries, fifty percent of those organizations were established or reorganized in the past
two decades. In addition, agricultural extension organizations worldwide are trying
strategies and methodologies that could increase the number of clientele farmers. These
strategies include new communication technologies for transferring agricultural
information (Wete) , as weB as different integrated communication systems like the
"Training and Visit" (T&V) approach by World Bank (Hulme; Benor, Harrison, and
Baxter; Benor and Baxter; Benor and Harrison), the "Strategic Extension Campaign" by
FAO (Adhikarya), the "Communications for Technology Transfer in Agriculture"
(CTTA) by USAID (McClure), and "Farming Systems Research and Extension" (FSR/E)
by Norwegian Development Cooperation (NORAD) (Haug).
Besides the different strategies and methodologies, alternative ways of financing
agricultural extension efforts have been attempted in several countries with existing
agricultural extension services as well as through the approaches used to introduce
agricultural extension. Those alternative ways include privatization, commercialization,
partnerships, farmer-directed efforts, and cost-recovery schemes. At times there appear
to be contradictions. For example, approaches similar to the U.S. Cooperative Extension
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system may achieve successes in some developing economies yet its funding sources may
be in jeopardy at home. Another problem arises when several efforts are ongoing
simultaneously in a developing country such as the former socialist countries. Several
world and/or country-based agencies may be introducing agricultural extension using
differing approaches mentioned above.
Despite the variety of approaches to implement, transform or improve the
agricultural extension, a prime issue in each approach involves the extent and relationship
of public and private sector efforts. Policy makers, departments of agriculture,
agricultural extension leadership, and international development agencies and other
donors working with agricultural extension are struggling with the issue of public-private
funding of agricultural extension services (Maalouf, Contado, and Adhikarya).
According to Rivera (l991b p.189) "there is increasing academic and public awareness
that agricultural extension includes a mixed set of public and private sector providers in
most countries". The public-private mix can vary considerably from one country to
another. In addition, this mix has changed for some developed and developing countries
since the beginning of their agricultural extension efforts.
Economic Factors Affecting Demand for and Supply of Public/Private Agricultural
Extension
Umali and Schwartz evaluate the farmer demand for "fee for service" agricultural
extension and the private supply of agricultural extension services. The following section
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presents the factors affecting the demand for and supply of public and/or private
agricultural extension.
Economic Factors Affecting Demand for Public/Private Agricultural Extension
According to Umali and Schwartz, "farmer demand for agricultural extension
services depends upon the expected net benefits from the investment in the new
information". For the purpose of evaluating farmer demand, farmers were separated into
two main categories. The first category includes subsistence and small farmers, or
farmers with small marketable output value. The second category includes medium and
large farmers, or farmers with medium and large marketable output value. Medium and
large farmers can spread the fixed cost of agricultural extension service fees over more
sales volume, resulting in lower per unit cost of agricultural extension, and so, increasing
their affordability of the service. Contrary, for small farmers, because of their small
marketable output value, the relative cost of agricultural extension will be high and the
service itself less profitable. Subsistence farmers have little or no incentive to use "fee
for service" agricultural extension services. In conclusion, Umali and Schwartz found
that the demand for "fee for service" agricultural extension will mostly emanate from
middle and large farms, while small and subsistence farmers will often not be served by
the private sector because of limited or absent effective demand.
"There are mechanisms, such as farmer associations, however, which can provide
the opportunity for farmers to take advantage of the economies of scale with respect to
the 'purchase' of the relevant specialized information" (Umali and Schwartz). In this
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case the association may employ or hire staff to provide their agricultural extension
needs.
However, farmer adoption of new technologies is not the only factor that affects
demand for public and/or private agricultural extension services. Other factors that affect
this demand include, farm size and land quality, input and output prices, access to cred it,
output markets and information about them, land tenure arrangements, availability of
inputs and infrastructure, government policies, degree of risk, availability of human
capital (Feder, Just and Zilberman; Feder and Umali).
Economic Factors Affecting Supply of Public/Private Agricultural Extension
"Private enterprises will supply a particular agricultural extension service only if
reasonable returns (directly or indirectly) can be captured by the firm II (Umali and
Schwartz). Private providers of agricultural extension services have their objectives and
target markets which are influenced by several factors. The study by Glover of contract
farming in East and Southern Africa provides a list of these factors. They include the
nature of the crop, prices and pricing policy, land tenure, macro-economic and macro-
institutional policies, payment systems, presence of alternative markets, and farmer
participation in management.
The profitability of private consulting firms is dependent upon the costs of and
returns to the services they provide. Umali and Schwartz list the economic factors and
government policies that affect the returns to and cost of private agricultural extension.
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Economic factors and government policies influencing the returns to private agricultural
extension include:
1. Nature of the market:
- type of product: high versus low value commodities;
- size: number of "medium" and "large" farms;
- rate of market growth;
2. Level of economic development:
- degree of development of input and output markets;
- degree of development of infrastructure;
- access to credit;
- income elasticities;
3. Degree of competition in agricultural extension services market;
4. Degree of specificity of information/technology;
5. Agricultural sector policies:
- input and output prices policies;
- regulatory policies;
6. Macro-economic policies affecting input and output markets:
- trade, monetary, exchange rate, fiscal policies;
7. Intellectual property legislation:
- availability of property rights protection;
- degree of legal enforcement.
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Economic factors and government policies influencing the costs of private
agricultural extension include:
1. Supply of and demand for trained agricultural extension personnel;
2. Economies of scale;
3. Availability of publicly generated agricultural extension materials;
4. Education policy;
5. Technology policy.
Private Sector Role in Providing Agricultural Extension Services
Rogers looks at the role of the private sector in providing agricultural extension
services in less developed countries. According to Rogers, private sector enterprises
become involved in agricultura~ extension because they believe this involvement will
increase their profits or enhance their ability to survive. For example, agricultural
processing firms enter into contractual agreements with groups or cooperatives of
farmers, providing agricultural extension services as a means of assuring the supply and
quality of the raw material or commodity for their factory. Also, firms that supply
agricultural inputs such as seeds, chemical fertilizers, and pesticides provide farmers with
a wide range of technical and managerial information both to assure the proper use of
their products and increase farmer's production and income, as well as increase demand
for their products.
Rogers also explains the advantages of public, private and mixed delivery systems
in particular situations:
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"1. Public institutions are preferable when benefits are diffuse, public policies
need changing and/or increased economic equity is a primary goal.
2. Mixed public/private entities work best when agricultural services not only
require intensive, responsive and flexible management, but also need
political influence to achieve program objectives.
3. Strictly private firms perform best when flexible management and direct
and continuing interaction with farmers are needed. "
This suggests that the private sector does have a role and can supplement the
public sector in providing agricultural extension services for certain groups of producers
under certain conditions. When private firms become involved in agricultural extension,
mutual benefits result. By helping farmers increase incomes and economic security,
firms can benefit too, by earning profits or achieving other strategic objectives. Finally,
Rogers concludes that "under certain conditions and working with commercial, not
subsistence farmers, private sector extension can be extremely effective in agricultural
production and rural development, including social equity".
Public and Private Providers of Agricultural Extension Services
A 1989 survey of agricultural extension organizations conducted by FAO ind icated
that there are 207 organizations providing agricultural extension services in the 113
developed and developing countries participating in the survey. Of this number, 160 or
86 % of the agricultural extension organizations are funded by government and are
connected to a ministry of agriculture or similar institution (Swanson, Farner, and
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Bahal). The rest of the organizations are attached to the private sector or non-
governmental organizations (NGOs). In considering the human resources for agricultural
extension, the FAO survey found that more than 90% of all agricultural extension
personnel are employed by ministry-based agricultural extension organizations. About
5 % of the agricultural extension personnel are employed by public university-based
agricultural extension organizations and less than 3 %3 are estimated to work for private
or parastatal-based commodity organizations.
According to the Global Consultation on Agricultural Extension (FAD 1990),
public agricultural extension systems are organizations whose purpose is to apply
practical knowledge to improve agricultural productivity and the quality of farm families.
For this research, only the aspect of agricultural extension regarding agricultural
productivity will be discussed.
According to Rogers and Umali and Schwartz, private providers of agricultural
extension are classified in the following major groups:




3Even though the FAO survey included all possible public and private extension
organizations for each country, the response rate from the private sector was very low.
Thus, the data about the private sector may underestimate the true level of private sector
involvement in the provision of agricultural extension services.
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5. Farmer OrganizationslAssociations/U nions
6. Non-Governmental Organizations
Agricultural Input Suppliers
Some input suppliers (e.g. seeds, agricultural chemicals, farm equipment,
livestock feed, and veterinary supplies) traditionally incorporate agricultural extension
in their marketing strategies (Umali and Schwartz). Input suppliers may provide farmers
with a wide range of technical and managerial information both to assure that their
products are used correctly and also to increase agricultural production and income to the
farmer (Rogers). This also assures more customers to buy more products in the future.
However, emphasizes is placed on information pertaining to the use of their products and
may not be perceived as unbiased providers of information.
Agro-processors
Agro-processing firms provide agricultural extension services to their farmer
suppliers to reduce the firms' supply risks. An example of such an approach are the
contract growing schemes, where agricultural extension services are usually a component
of these contracts. These firms provide farmers with information regarding new





Agro-marketing firms function in a manner similar to processing firms. Agro-
marketing firms will provide agricultural extension services to farmers prOOuc'ng for
them on contract as a means of reducing input risks. Services provided by these firms
include type and level of use of inputs, disease control, and harvest and post-harvest
techniques.
Consulting Firms
Consulting firms will provide agricultural extension services mainly for medium
and large farms and related to the more specialized technologies. These firms may
generate their own research output, mainly applied research regarding farm production
and management to be provided to their clients. In addition, they will utilize publically-
generated research results in their consulting.
Farmer Organizations/Associations/Unions
Farmer organizations/associations/unions are traditionally organized around
specific agricultural functions (e.g. production, input supply, marketing, advocacy)
and/or commodities (e.g. food, livestock, credit) and agricultural extension is frequently
one of the multiple services they provide. Some of these organizations cover only one
commodity, while others include a broad selection of commodities. Agricultural
extension services offered by these organizations range from commodity-specific topics




Non-governmental organizations as a provider of agricultural extension services
are mainly focused on areas that are neglected or serviced inadequately by the
government. They often promote, develop and diffuse agricultural options designed for
small farmers or widely used practices. Many NGOs perform both agricultural extension
and research functions.
Identifying Different Public-Private Combinations
Diverse agricultural extension funding and delivery arrangements have been
undertaken since the mid-1980s by governments worldwide in the name of "privatisation"
(Rivera and Cary). Concerning agricultural extension, "privatisation" is used in the
broadest sense of introducing or increasing private sector participation. This does not
necessarily imply a transfer of designated state-owned assets to the private sector. In
fact, alternative ways of financing agricultural extension include cost recovery schemes,
commercialization, and privatization. However, the same country-cases are classified
into different categories in the existing literature, for example the British approach in one
case is considered a commercialization approach, in another case a privatization
approach. One reason for this certainly is related to the different opinions of different
authors. But the most important reason for different classifications is that in most of the
countries, the original objective of the change has varied as the countries have continued
with the implementation process. To continue with the British case, the original
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objective of the change was a cost-recovery attempt, but recently the objective has been
revised to be the complete privatization of the public agricultural extension.
Cost-recovery Schemes
Cost-recovery schemes by definition include different options being pursued to
reduce the total and/or unit costs of providing public agricultural extension services.
Wilson analyzes different cost recovery schemes applied in several Latin American
countries: "a) reducing the intensity of coverage level over time to specific farmers; b)
using mass media to increase coverage level and reduce unit costs; c) linking research
agencies directly to farmers through mass media and training of private agricultural
extensionists; and d) stratifying farmers by income level and charging fees to higher
income producers who opt to continue to use public services".
Chile is one of the cases of cost recovery reviewed. In this case the government
decided to provide free technical assistance to small producers and encourage the
development of private sector technical services for larger, more commercial producers.
Private consulting firms were selected through a public tender to deliver agricultural
extension services to small farmers. Small farmers would pay for these services using
vouchers provided to them for free by the government. These free agricultural extens ion
services would target two groups of small farms. The first group includes those small
farmers with sufficient resources to attain self-sufficiency and/or market surplus
production. The farmers in this group cover IS % of the cost of the service and the goal
is to increase their share of the cost to 50 %. The second group includes the poorer
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farmers who lack sufficient resources to achieve self-sufficiency. The cost of this
program is totally covered by governmental agricultural extension and the intent is to
expand services in this program. Thus, the purpose of this approach is to target free
services, limit the period of coverage to general recipients, and work with groups to
reduce unit costs.
In Colombia, the cost recovery approach means decentralization of the provision
of the agricultural extension services from the federal government to municipalities that
will pay for those services out of local tax revenues. The central agency responsible for
providing agricultural extension services now will train private agricultural extensionists
for a fee and municipal agricultural extensionists at no charge.
In Ecuador, the role of input suppliers as an alternative to public agricultural
extension was surveyed. A 1986 regional study funded by USAID to determine the
relationships between agricultural input vendors, agricultural extension agents and
farmers, showed that input suppliers' servi.ces are biased towards large and medium-size
farmers and did not ensure agricultural extension service to small farmers (Van
Crowder).
In Mexico, two different means are used to reduce the cost of public agricultural
extension service (World Bank 1987). First, producers are stratified by income level and
progressively higher income producers are oriented toward private agricultural extension,
or a larger share of the cost is required if they continue to require public agricultural
extension services. This allows public agricultural extension to place more emphasis on
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the low and middle-income producers. Secondly, direct contact between researchers and
farmers, especially high-income farmers, is promoted (also, see footnote 2).
In addition to the above Latin American country models, a cost-recovery approach
was implemented in Ireland. In 1980, reforms were initiated to integrate the advisory
and formal training functions of the Ministry of Agriculture with the advisory and
education functions of the County Committees of Agriculture (27 of these) within a single
structure (ANDA). A public organization, the Agricultural Development Authority
(ACOT), was set up as a statutory organization with a Board made up of representatives
of farm organizations and the Ministries of Agriculture and Education. In 1987, charges
for the services were introduced. Prices were fixed at a moderate level so that all
farmers could, where possible, have access to the agricultural extension services.
In 1988, the Ireland government decided to amalgamate ACOT and the public
organization in charge of research, thus setting up a new publ ic body called TEAGASC
("teaching" in Irish), the Agricultural and Food Development Authority. This operation
was part of a policy to reduce the number of public bodies with the aim of reducing
expenditures to agencies by pooling general services. TEAGASC is fully responsible for
the agricultural research, training and extension services for [rish agriculture and food
industries. As a result, the public expenditures in agriculture research, and agricultural
extension decreased from 34 to 50 %, wh ile the overall cut in public expenditures was
only 6% (Wilson). In analyzing these cuts, Leavy notes that the cost to the Irish
economy of decreasing public expenditures on agricultural extension was approximately
£40 million in 1988 and could reach £220 million per annum by 1992. The suggested
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reason for this is that cuts have reduced the number of farmers contacted by the advisory
(agricultural extension) service from 80,000 to 20,000 and the geographical area
impacted from 8 million to 3 million acres.
Commercial ization
Commercialization, as ReTclls defines it, is "the change from providing a free
public service financed by government to a commercial operation financed by user
charges". According to Cary (1995) "commercialization implies charging for services
while retaining the agency in public ownership, and agency personnel who are not
government employees". In the case of commercialization, the government retains
ownership but the agency has a separate board, an accounting and reporting system
independent from the government, and a requirement to 'make a profit' or to be more
or less self funding.
The commercialization approach was used in New Zealand and Australia. In the
case of New Zealand, the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (MAF) found it
necessary to restructure itself into four businesses when facing budget reductions in
public expenditures. One of the four new businesses created was MAFTechnology,
which was responsible for agricultural extension services. MAFTechno]ogy, as the other
parts of MAF, had to find other ways to cover the costs of their services. Under the
new circumstances, their revenues would come from three client groups: the 'public
good' identified by government and represented by the Minister of Agriculture; the
34
agricultural industries; and the 'private good', problem-solving research and consultancy
services to individual farmers, groups, or firms (Hercus).
The service was fully commercialized in 1992 and by 1994 the agency was self-
funding (Cary 1995). The government then sought to fully make private the service,
which was subsequently sold to Wrightson Ltd., New Zealand's largest rural input
supplier and selling agency. In 1994 the number of consultants employed by the agency
was about half the number employed prior to commercialization. This is also noted by
Bloome in his study about the commercialization in New Zealand where he states that
the number of professional staff and clientele were reduced by more than 50 % compared
to the number prior to commercialization. At the time of full privatization the number
had fallen to less than a third. There was a significant downsizing from 450 advisers in
the mid 1980s to less than 100 consultants in 1995 (Ritchie). Since privatization, an
active recruiting campaign has increased the number of consultants employed to over
100.
There has been no formal assessment of the New Zealand changes (Cary 1995).
The earlier commercialization experience was perceived to have had a positive effect of
moving agricultural extension staff 'beyond the farm gate' to an involvement in the
broader production-processing-transporting-marketing chain. There was a shift to a client
orientation and a concern to produce results rather than simply to engage in activities
(Herclls). However, Walker suggested that there appeared to be less interaction between
organizations, reduced feedback from farmers to science providers, and limited




Also, as Bloome notes, "the capacity to conduct public benefit Extension programs no
longer exists except as the government may contract with private entities".
In Australia, proposed institutional changes in agricultural extension service
delivery include service reduction, commercialization by charging fees for services, and
contract delivery by private agents. A review of the delivery of government agricultural
extension services in the Australian state of Victoria determined that government-
provided services conferring essentially private benefits to individuals it was more
desirable and more efficient to be delivered by private advisers, rather than engaging in
cost recovery by government fee charging (Watson, Hely, O'Keeffe, Cary, and Clark).
To provide an alternative framework for farm industry research organizations to take a
greater responsibility for technology transfer, the Victorian Government has proposed
'outsourcing' as a means for delivery of future agricultural extension programs (Cary
1995). Outsourcing means that the government agricultural extension agency wi.1I retain
a core pool of agricultural extension project staff and 'buy in' private sector profess ional
services with skills that the agency considers unnecessary to maintain. Outsourcing
implies government-provided funding and privately-delivered services.
Meanwhile, Tasmania, the smallest Australian State, was the first to seek to
'commercialize' agricultural extension services (Cary 1995). In the 1980s the Tasmanian
government commenced charging fees for agricultural extension services. The
experiment did not meet with widespread success. And there was a substantial decline





In the context of trying to find alternative ways to finance publicly provided
agricultural extension services, one of the approaches chosen is the transfer of the
provision of such services to the private sector, or privatization. However, "the phrase
'privatisation of agricultural extension' is generally misleading" (Rivera and Cary). In
most cases, governments have not actually "privatized" their agricultural extension
services, at least not yet. Privatization implies a full transfer of ownership from
government to a private entity, with that entity paying all costs and receiving any profits.
In the case of agricultural extension, governments have followed a number of
approaches, such as commercializing the services while retaining it as a public agency,
shifting delivery services to the private sector while maintaining supervision and basic
funding of delivery, or pursuing cost recovery measures to pay for the service (Rivera
and Cary). However, in most cases those approaches are the first step toward the final
objective, the complete transfer of resources and responsibility for agricultural extension
from the public sector to the private sector.
According to LeGouis, three major methods have been used with regard to
privatization of agricultural extension:
"1. Public financing ... only for the kind of services that are of direct concern to
the general public.
2. Direct charging for some individual services with direct return in the form of
improved income ... .
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3. Mixed funding shared between public and private professional association
contributions for some services where the benefits are shared. "
In other words, the first method means that government will provide only those
services considered to be of public interest. Other services considered of private interest,
previously provided by the government, now will be transferred to the private sector.
The second method introduces fees for the type of services with immediate benefits for
the farmer, while the services are still provided by the government. A third method
consists of mixed public and private funding for some services. These will include
services like applied research. training of farmers and agents, and improvements of
agricultural extension methods and tools.
The main reason for privatization of agricultural extension relates to budgetary
problems. In most of the countries the share of national resources earmarked for
agriculture has been steadily decreasing (LeGouis). This is a result of the steady
decrease of the farm population in all DECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development) member countries and the relative decrease in political power of
agriculture. Another motive for the trend toward privatization is the gradual transfer of
responsibility for managing and funding agricultural extension services to farm
organizations.
Methods of privatization are typified in three European countries: France, the
United Kingdom and the Netherlands (LeGouis). France never really developed a public
sector agricultural extension service (Rivera and Cary). The agricultural extension




cooperative effort among farmers, Agricultural Chambers which are elected by farmers
(ANDA). At the national level, National Association for Agricultural Development
(ANDA), a joint government/professional body, is used to bring a consensus between
government and the professional body regarding the directions of the development. In
addition, ANDA manages the National Agricultural Development Fund (FNDA). Nearly
three-quarters of the total resources for applied agricultural research, training and
extension are collected at the farm level through different payment methods, like direct
payment, voluntary or compulsory fees, and/or land taxes (LeGouis). Agricultural
Chambers are also supported financiall y by pubIic funds. In 1989, 80 % of the total
resources for development financing came from the agricultural sector in the form of
charges and various subscriptions, farmers' direct participation and bodies' own self
financing. Funding from charges (taxes) on most agricultural products, composed 19 %
of the resources for the FNDA. In the same time with the increased financial
contribution by farmers to FNDA, farmers through Agricultural Chambers, have access
to greater management. In the case of services that do not imply an immediate return,
charging fees is approached in different ways. In some cases, this is attempted to be
solved by introducing compulsory fees. In other cases linking the increasing degree of
self-financing with greater responsibility taken by farm organizations in the management
of the services is used.
The British approach promotes direct payment by the users without privatization
of agricultural extension services. The public agency, the Agricultural Development and
Advisory Service (ADAS), continues to be responsible for agricultura~ research and
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extension and relies on government employees to carry out the work (LeGouis). Fees,
on a time cost basis, are introduced for certain services that were previously offered free
of charge. This change has helped reduce by about 25 percent the publ icly funded
budget of ADAS over a three year period. Charging for some services commenced in
1987 and the initial basis for this privatization process was the recovery of costs, but this
has since evolved into the objective to transfer a complete section of the government
extension services into the private sector (Bunney). According to the contact people
working with ADAS, the complete privatization of the agency is supposed to happen by
April 1997. As a result of the cost recovery, in 1995, ADAS was operating with 20
offices compared to 80 in 1992, and had around 2,200 staff in 1995 compared with 6,300
in the early 1970s. The overall revenue of ADAS has been relatively static with the
proportion from commercial revenue increasing. In addition, total costs have been
declining, and have reduced the difference between revenue and costs to about 12 % of
the costs, compared to over 18.5 % in 1992. Bunney emphasizes that a significant
outcome of the change has been the development of effective management information
systems to enable management to identify the true costs and returns of all ADAS
activities and to relate these to their business objectives and plans. The process has also
shown that only a proportion of farming businesses use these services to any significant
amount. Based on his own working experience in the new structure, Bunney expl.ains
that perhaps up to 80 % of the farmers are not using the services to any great degree.




proportion of agricultural output, the 80 % represent many small family farms in the more
rural and less developed parts of the country.
In the Netherlands, privatization is limited to about half of the staff of the
agricultural extension services and the other half still budgeted and managed by the
Ministry of Agriculture. The privatization approach followed by the Dutch is that of a
gradual privatization. The transfer to the private sector mostly involves field agents of
the agricultural extension service. Agricultural research and coordinating services
between agricultural research and extension continue to be controlled by government and
are provided free to producers. The privatization process of the public agricultural
extension organization, the DLV (Dienst Landbouwyoorlichting or the Agricultural
Advisory Service) would go through three stages: 1) the transformation of the DLV as
an independent body within the Ministry of Agriculture, 2) the creation of a Foundation
with features of private organization, with approval from the government, and 3) the
transfer of the status of its employees from officials of the state to that of employees of
the Foundation (ANDA). The DLV has already identified its products (services) and
analyzed their production costs. However, not all of the DLV's services and activities
will be invoiced. Some of them are directly linked to governmental directives and this
is why the government is committing to contribute 50% of the operating expenses of the
service until 2002.
Based on the analysis of the above country situations, LeGouis concludes that
evolution toward privatization will have different impacts, depending on the policy




France, it was the political decision to develop self-supported agricultural extension
services. In the Netherlands, the change is designed to accompany the tendency toward
fewer, larger and more competitive farms capable of paying for some agricultural
extension services.
LeGouis also emphasizes the close relationship between the source of funds and
the general policy guidelines. Depending on the taxpayers or farmers relative
contribution to the resources to conduct agricultural extension services, priority is given
respectively to consumers' objectives or farmers' more immediate concerns.
An important issue can be derived from the British approach. The British model,
with rates of services on a time basis, does not differentiate using the agricultural
extension agents' qualification. A marketing approach would suggest charging a higher
fee for more qualified agents. This, as a result, would require them to be given a higher
salary to keep them in service, with lower salaries for other agents who are not as
qualified. The lack of discrimination in relation to agricultural extension agents'
qualification makes the allocation of public agents difficult. The increase of private
sector interest in hiring the best public agents will make the allocation problem even
more difficult, challenging the function of the agricultural extension services on a
commercial basis while still remaining accessible to small and relatively low income
farmers. In the long run, much of the best agents' time may be monopolized by a small
elite of the already larger and wealthier farmers. If this happens, is such policy




Management of Resources for Agricultural Extension
LeGouis points out the main issues involved in mobilizing and managing resources
for agricultural advisory work. First, each country attempts to achieve the highest level
of cost-effectiveness over time. In other words, expenditures for providing agricultural
extension services at the farm level lead to savings in the management of markets
(intervention through funds provided by the public authorities). LeGouis compares this
with the general problem of evaluating present costs in relation to future returns,
emphasizing that the concept of savings in the tong term is hard to accept. In the case
of agricultural extension services, their effects can only be observed in the long term.
This has made necessary official (public) or semi-official financing of these services.
Secondly, there is a need to assure the best possible use of limited financial and
human resources, especially during a restructuring and redeployment period between
different partners (government and farmers) and at the different levels (national and
regional). LeGouis c1.assifies the sources of financing agricultural extension services in
three groups: official financing which means direct or indirect provision and management
of these services by the government; self-financing, in the case of direct payment for
services obviously profitable for the user; and commodity group financing, where
resources are collected through taxes or fees levied on a certain commodity. Mostly
because of budgetary constraints, a combination of the different types of sources is
necessary. According to LeGouis "the proportional allocation of resources will vary
according to the possibilities and motivations of the different contributors". Further he




maintaining the activities of the agricultural extension services in the interests of both the
community and users". However, the plurality of sources of financing involves
management constraints such as the contradict between the interests of the taxpayer and
the user, and the establishment of a balanced budget for different advisory units within
the agency.
The third issue concerns the trade-off between the economic and social objectives,
for instance, whether to give priority to the objectives of larger, higher-income farmers,
or try to reach the largest possible number of farmers when providing agricultural
extension services. In other words, should agricultural extension emphasize economic
objectives by working mainly with larger farmers or should it emphasize social objectives
by concentrating on working with smaller farmers? According to LeGouis, this is a
policy issue and several factors should be considered in choosing a realistic approach.
Some of these factors are relative size of the agricultural force, average age of farmers,
size of farms, average level of training of farmers, the degree of market organization and
the competition upstream and downstream industries, export prospects, the influence of
the farmers' unions and the representation of agricultural interests in political institutions,
etc.
The Institutional Aspect of the Privatization Process of the Agricultural Extension
There are two themes in the broader privatization debate: a "political economy"
consideration of the role and size of government in an economy, which focuses on




reduce government outlays (Rivera and Cary). The second theme, as it was noted
earlier, has been the primary reason for the reassessment of the publicly funded
agricultural extension. However, the rationale for public versus private activity in an
economy must also be considered.
In mixed economies, the prevailing economic justification for government
involvement in an activity such as agricultural extension is because of market failure, that
is, when an appropriate resource allocation cannot result based on the market mechanism
alone. Market failure may arise because some goods or services are public goods (such
as publicly-funded agricultural research knowledge) which can be consumed in a non-
rival fashion by all members of society and any individual's consumption will not reduce
the amount available for other individuals. Private firms will not provide such goods
even though there may be significant gains for producers and consumers because the
benefits of providing such goods cannot be appropriated by them.
In addition, private goods sometimes are subject to market failure, when the
operation of private markets does not provide certain services at socially optimal levels,
or where external costs or benefits are accrued by others rather than the provider of the
goods. Market failure also may arise when current generations place insufficient value
on preservation of resources for future generations. These later circumstances are
particularly characteristic of land and water degradation (Cary 1983). Publicly funded
agricultural extension dealing with conservation is often directed to overcoming such
markets failures (Barr and Cary).
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Government support for the provision of agricultural extension services is based
on arguments that such services would be inadequately provided without intervention, or
for reasons of equity, because services would not be available to a socially desirable
extent. The debate concerning the general privatization has centered on one hand,
whether certain government activities could be performed more efficiently by private
sector and, on the other hand, whether inequities may arise because not all individuals
have access to resources to purchase private supplied services.
The argument for agricultural extension privatization is concerned with more
efficient delivery of services (because of the greater efficiency of private markets for
services) and lowered government expenditures (Cary 1995). Efficient markets quickly
resolve questions of supply and demand by swapping information between users and
suppliers of agricultural extension services about what services are required and what
might be supplied, as well as feedback about service provision. Allied to the efficiency
argument is the potential of more direct accountability between agricultural extension
provider and client. As Cary (1995) states, unlike the U.S. County Agent system, the
delivery of agricultural extension in Australia through state Departments of Agriculture
has resulted in control via centralized government bureaucracies. Agricultural extension
work was planned in conjunction with head office personnel and only limited
participation by local farm people. This generally has led to a low level of direct
accountability to clients.
The argument for public agricultural extension IS that much agricultural
information is a public good (or a mix of public and private goods that is difficult to
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separate). In addition, only government agricultural extension services are likely to
provide unbiased information, promote concern for better management of common
property natural resources, and to provide for farmers who lack access to educational or
management services (Rivera and Cary).
According to Cary (1995), a number of conditions can be considered necessary
or conducive for a transition to a fee-based, or privatized, agricultural extension system.
First, the service in question should have clear private good characteristics, such as many
agricultural extension services provided directly to individual farmers. Second, the
request for sophisticated and more special ized management systems to go along with the
modernization of the agricultural sector and the use of more sophisticated purchased
inputs is a primary focus of the service. Public agricultural extension systems will be
unlikely to adequately or equitably deliver services in these circumstances. Third,
agricultural sectors in industrialized economies with well-developed infrastructure and
better educated farmers, geographically concentrated and integrated with both public and
private institutional knowledge systems, are well disposed for adoption of fee-based
systems. Where such conditions are not present, commercialization or privatization is
more problematic. Fourth, for a transition to a fee paying service, a nucleus of private





The Rationale for Public Funding of Agricultural Extension Programs
Bennett concludes that public funding of an agricultural extension program is
justifiable to the extent the program 1) contributes needed benefits to the public, 2)
compares favorably with and complements other programs, and 3) distributes public
benefits not provided through the public sector. The first criteria is concerned with the
public benefits versus private benefits provided by a certain agricultural extension
program. Publicly funded agricultural extension programs should provide greater
benefits to the general public than to program participants (Bloome; Penrose and Rohrer)
and these programs' public benefits should exceed their costs to the public (Alston,
Pardey, and Carter). The second criteria means that public funding of an agricultural
extension program may be justified if it helps achieve identified public benefits in a more
cost-effective way than alternative approaches (University of Wisconsin-Extension). In
addition, the program should complement the roles of other programs in achieving public
benefits. The third criteria redresses market failure situations. Besides the noted
situations of environmental and public health risks and inequality in access to public
information, Bennett notes a third situation, that of emergencies and extreme variability.
In addition to the three above situations, the public funding for agricultural extension
programs may be justified by the performance of five roles: 1) transfer of practices, 2)
conduct of applied research on practices, 3) education, 4) validation of commercial
information on technologies, and 5) strengthening leadership of knowledge systems. The
rationale for the first three roles is related to their nature as a public good. The fourth




to eliminate possible loss of public benefits. The fifth is an important role of agricultural
extension programs to increase coordination and collaboration between researchers,
public/private providers of agricultural extension services, and farmers within agricultural
knowledge systems.
Summary
Agricultural extension systems involve a mix of public and private providers. The
private providers of agricultural extension services include agricultural input suppliers,
agro-processors, agro-marketing firms, cons uIting firms, farmer
organizations/associations/unions, and non-governmental organizations. The demand for
"fee for service" agricultural extension will mostly emanate from middle and large
farmers, while small and subsistence farmers will tend to be negiected by the private
sector. This means that there is increasing willingness by middle and large farmers to
pay for the type of services that provide them with direct benefits and help them maintain
their competitive edge.
The latter conclusion and budget reductions faced by the public sector in general,
and agricultural extension in particular, are the reason that different countries are moving
toward alternative ways of financing agricultural extension. These ways include cost-
recovery schemes, as well as commercialization and privatization approaches.
However, a high percentage of farmers simply cannot afford to pay for services
provided by the private sector. In addition, private sector agricultural extension most




Thus, these two areas will still remain the responsibility of the public agricultural
extension to address. Other functions to be performed by public agricultural extension
include control of resource allocation for agricultural extension services, validation of
services provided by different private providers, as well as coordination of agricultural







The conceptual framework is developed in this chapter to analyze the
privatization/commercialization scenario from the perspective of both neoclassical and
institutional economics. The neoclassical analysis is organized in three main sections.
The first section deals with the definition of public goods and services, plus the
classification of public and private goods and services. The section concludes with an
evaluation of public versus private provision of public goods and services. The second
section examines the role of agricultural information as a competitive tool. Then the
section continues with the classification of agricultural information into different
categories ranging from pure public good to pure private good. rn the final section, the
theory of industrial organization is employed to analyze the structure and the performance
of the market for agricultural extension services.
The analysis from the perspective of institutional economIcs starts with a
discussion about the role of institutions and the transaction costs in the economic
development of a society. In addition, the role of the public sector in affecting the
decisions regarding the resource allocation in an economy, as well as its direct
participation in creating some resources for allocation is examined. In this context, the
role of the public sector in the specific situation of the privatization or commercialization





This section develops the conceptual framework to analyze cost-recovery,
commercialization and privatization of agricultural extension using neoclassical economic
theory. Classification of the goods in public/private categories and the appl ication of this
classification with regard to agricultural information are presented. Also, the conceptual
framework to analyze the market for agricultural extension services is provided.
Definition of Public Goods and Services
Roth defines public services as "any service available to the public, whether
provided publicly or privately". According to Roth, public services are the responsibility
of government, and include services like education, health, electricity, urban transport,
telecommunications, transport infrastructure, and water and sewerage.
In addition, Nicholson and Feldman attribute two features to the public goods and
services that seem to characterize many of the governmental goods and services:
nonexclusivity and nonrivalry. Nonexclusivity means that people may not be excluded
from the benefits the goods or services provide. Nonrivalry means that goods or services
can be provided to additional users at zero marginal social cost. Public goods and
services are defined in this study as "goods and services that provide nonexclusive





Categories of Public/Private Goods and Services
Nabli and Nugent (l989b p. 82) classify goods and services in nine categories.
These categories range from "pure public goods" to "pure private goods" with several
intermediate categories (Table 1).
TABLE I




Consumption Non-excludable Excludable at Excludable at
Moderate Cost Negligible Cost
Jointly Pure Public Goods Public Goods with Pubhc Goods with
Consumable, Moderate Exclusion
No Congestion Exclusion Costs
Jointly Common Property Mixed Public and Club Goods/
Consumable with Resources Club Goods Local Publ ic
Congestion (Agricultural Goods
Extension Services)
Not Jointly Open Access Closed Access Pure Private
Consumable Natural Resources Natural Resources Goods
The two criteria used to classify the goods and services are excludability and
rivalry (which they refer to as jointness in consumption). Three classes are used for each
criterion. Excludability is classified as non-excludable, excludable at moderate cost, and
excludable at negligible cost. Jointness in consumption is classified as jointly consumable
with no congestion, jointly consumable with congestion, and not jointly consumable.
According to Nabli's and Nugent's (l989b) classification of goods and services,












CLASSIFICATION OF GOODS AND SERVICES ACCORDING TO
UMALI AND SCHWARTZ
Umali and Schwartz use a simpler classification of goods and services, based on
the same criteria: excludability and subtractability (or rivalry) (Table 2). According to
them, the categories are pure private goods, pure public goods, and two categories in
between: toll goods and common pool goods. Toll goods are characterized by
category which features excludability at moderate oost and jointness in consumption with
excludability but low rivalry, while common pool goods are subtractable but have low
Public or Private Provision of Public Goods and Services
Roth first explains that production of goods and services can be organized in two
ways: 1) through economic markets, and 2) under government administration where the
production decisions are based upon rules and procedures determined politically. Roth
then notes that "economists have conventionally analyzed the choice between the public
and private provision of goods and services on the basis of the potential 'market





most, and the economy is not allocating resources in the most effective way, then
markets are said not to function effectively. When such situations occur, government
may intervene to improve matters. Possible government interventions indude regulation,
taxation, subsidy, or even production by the government controlled sector (public sector).
Regarding these government interventions, Roth warns that the actions may not
necessarily be the right solution. Some reasons for this are the information available to
the government may not be better than that available to private markets, and may even
be worse; political pressure on government by different groups may outweigh the
consumer preferences; and regulation may protect the regulated industry rather than
consumer. Thus, potential "government failure" needs to be considered, as well as
"market failure", in choosing between alternative institutional arrangements.
Roth concludes that the concept of market failure is helpful in identifying
situations where the appropriate role of the government is necessary. He lists five
situations where the private markets cannot provide the most efficient and appropriate
patterns of goods and services: "1) where natural monopoly exists; 2) where increased
production is associated with decreasing costs; 3) where externalities exist and are not
reflected in the accounts of private suppliers; 4) where it is difficult to charge for a
service or to exclude those who do not pay; 5) where merit goods are involved".
Merit goods are those goods and services that society considers to have special merit but






Agricultural Information as a Competitive Tool
Information in agriculture, as in other sectors, is a tool used by firms competing
with one another. Actors at each level in the system are conceptualized as pursuing
sustainable competitive advantages as they consume more and better information in an
effort to enhance production efficiency and product quality, manage liability risks, and
capitalize on opportunities (Wolf). Larger firms compete more for information because
they are better prepared to capture benefits from the information. Private firms often are
not willing to share information and as the industry is more concentrated, sharing of
information diminishes. But, historically, much progress in agriculture has come not
only from original dissemination of technology and information, but also from the
considerable sharing among farmers on a one-to-one basis, through associations,
exhibitions, etc.
According to Wolf, information-based innovation is seen as a long-lived benefit
stream because its value is uniquely site-specific and it can be readily internalized by
those who control it. In this context, larger, integrated agricultural f,rms benefit more
from privately supplied information because of its nature as argued above.
Based on the above presentation, several questions arise. How will changing the
availability of information affect farms of different sizes as the privatization and/or
commercialization of public provision of agricultural extension takes place? What will
be the implications of such changes for the agricultural industry and its participants?
The importance of information will be emphasized even more as the agricultural
products are expected to be increasingly differentiated and commodity subsectors become
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increasingly vertically coordinated. As a result, at the farm level, information will be
increasingly valued as resource allocation decisions, quality and timing of products, and
financial and risk management become determinants of success (Wolf).
Classification of Agricultural Information
Agricultural information transmitted to and from farmers via the agricultural
extension system can be classified into two broad groups: pure agricultural information
and agricultural information inherently tied to new physical inventions (Umali and
Schwartz). Pure agricultural information is defined as any information that can be used
without the acquisition of a specific physical technology. It includes cultural and
production techniques (e.g. timing of land preparation, planting and harvesting, optimal
input use, animal. husbandry and livestock health, crop protection); farm management
(e.g. record keeping, farm budgeting, financial and organizational management and legal
issues); marketing and processing information (e.g. prices, market options, storage
procedures, packaging techniques, transport); and community development (e.g. the
organization of farmers' associations). Agricultural information inherently tied to new
physical inventions, or expressed in other words, agricultural inventions or technologies
include inputs to farm production (e.g. new agricultural machinery, agricultural
chemicals, seeds, livestock breeds, and livestock supplies and pharmaceuticals);
technologies facilitating farm management (e.g. electronic telecommunications and
laboratory equipment, and computers and computer software); and marketing and
processing equipment (e.g. drying, milling, storage, and packaging technologies). At the
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Public/Private Good Categories of Agricultural Information
The previous section classified agricultural information into two categories: 1)








information flow. It transmits to researchers and policy makers information about the
and technological development.
pure agricultural information and 2) agricultural inventions and technologies.
Pure Agricultural Information
same time, the agricultural extension system often serves as a two-way channel of
discussion of the public/private nature of these categories follows.
Pure agricultural information is designed to improve existing production practices,
farm management, or marketing and processing activities. This information is provided
to farmers by means of traditional agricultural extension approaches, such as personal
contact with agricultural extension agents, lectures and seminars, training and farm
demonstrations, and direct conversations. In the short term, th is type of information is
a toll good. This is because, while the information delivered to participating farmers
does not reduce the availability of the same information to other farmers, the attendance
of farmers in these agricultural extension programs is limited because of the facilities and
infrastructure. For example, lecture halls, demonstration fields, and classrooms have
fixed capacities. Also farmers face costs to get to these programs in cases when they are




agricultural information transforms it into a public good. The diffusive character of such
information is an incentive for farmers not to pay for it, but simply free-ride by obtaining
it from their neighbors or friends. The free-rider problem and non-excludability in the
long run limit the possibilities to charge fees for the direct provision of such information.
Thus, there will be little or no incentive for the private sector to provide such services,
and so, its delivery will have to remain a public responsibility. In the context of this
research it is hypothesized that in the case of the commercialization or privatization of
the public agricultural extension, these services will be neglected by the commercial or
private agricultural extension. In the case of cost recovery. it is hypothesized that the
services of a public good nature will decline in significance, as a greater emphasis will
be put on the services of a more private good nature.
Agricultural Inventions and Technologies
Information related with modern technologies, such as agricultural machinery,
agricultural chemicals, hybrid seeds and livestock, veterinary supplies and
pharmaceuticals, as explained above, is embodied in the invention. Such information is
characterized by high excludability and rivalry, and thus is classified as a private good.
The private nature of this type of information enables the private sector to provide these
technologies and also the technical information that accompanies their use. Contrary to
the pure agricultural information, it is expected these kind of services to be the main
services provided by commercial or private agricultural extension. Even in the case of




maintained, we would expect increased emphasis in this array of services by agricultural
extension.
Structure of Market for Agricultural Extension Services
To understand the performance of markets as the cost-recovery,
commercialization, and privatization move takes place, first the structure of such markets
should be analyzed. The methodology (theory) of industrial organization is used to
evaluate the market performance based on the "structure, conduct, performance" analysis
(Harris).
"Market structure refers to the organizational characteristics of a market ... that
seem to exercise a strategic influence on the nature of competition and pricing within the
market" (Hain, p. 7). The dimensions of market structure are: 1) the degree of seller
concentration, 2) the degree of buyer concentration, 3) the degree of product
differentiation, and 4) the entry condition to the market. Clodius and Mueller add the
distribution of market information and its adequacy in sharpening price and quality
comparisons and in reducing risk.
Market conduct is the "pattern of behavior that enterprises follow in adapting or
adjusting to the markets in which they sell (or buy)" (Hain, p. 9). In particular, aspects
of market conduct are methods employed to determine price and output, sales promotion,
and coordination policies and the extent of exclusionary tactics directed against
established rivals or potential entrants.
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Market performance represents the economic results of structure and conduct
(Bain, p. 9). The principal aspects of market performance are: 1) the technical efficiency
of production, 2) the relationship between the selling price and the long-run marginal and
average costs of production, 3) actual output level compared with the price - long-run
marginal cost equilibrium level of output, 4) size of sales promotion, and 5) the rate of
progress in developing both new products and techniques of production.
According to Bain, the classification of industries by market structure, on the
basis of seller concentration, product differentiation, and the condition of entry, results
in the following categories:
I. Atomistic industries
1. Without product differentiation
1. With product differentiation
II. Oligopolistic industries
1. Without product differentiation
- with easy entry
- with moderately difficult entry
- with blockaded entry
1. With product differenti.ation
- with easy entry
- with moderately difficult entry




The market for agricultural extension services historically has a starting point as
a monopolistic market with only one agent in the market, the public sector. The
increased commercialization of the agricultural sector has served as an important factor
in shaping the structure of market for agricultural extension services.
The structure of agricultural industry has been changing, among other factors, as
a result of the increase in nonmarket coordination. So, the manufacturer, who may be
a processing or marketing firm, engages in backward vertical integration or contracting
(Kilmer; Schrader), or the agricultural input suppliers in contracting (Schrader; Wolf).
Mighell and Jones identify four reasons for coordinating by nonmarket means: to increase
efficiency, to gain market advantage, to reduce risk and uncertainty, and to obtain (or
reduce cost of) financing. The increase in nonmarket coordination in the agricultural
industry, related to the agricultural extension services, means a private sector (processing
and marketing firms, and input suppliers) provision of such services. The type of
information provided by this segment of the private sector, as explained above, is
embodied in the input or technology it is accompanying, and thus has a private good
nature. However, the private sector will provide agricultural extension servIces
pertaining to general agricultural information, despite being a public good, in some
special circumstances (Umali and Schwartz). Processing and marketing firms will
provide agricultural extension services when the costs of providing the agricultural
extension services are lower compared to the reduction in input supply and/or quality
risks and therefore production costs. In addition, commercialization of agricultural
production, the increase In the degree of specificity of agricultural
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information/technology, development in input and output markets, infrastructure, and
access to credit, and the proper legal environment regarding property rights and legal
enforcement, serve as incentives in the development of a market for private consulting
firms.
To summarize, the two broad groups in the market for agricultural extension
services are the traditional public institutions and the private institutions providing such
services. Private sector institutions are increasingly recognized as powerful actors at the
farm level, yet very little is known about them (Wolf). According to literature, the
private sector consists of different segments like input suppliers, agro-processing firms,
agro-marketing firms, consulting firms, and non-governmental organizations. The
market for agricultural extension services has evolved from a monopolistic one consisting
only of public institutions, to a more competitive market with publ ic institutions as well
as private ones competing with each other. In the most extreme cases, with the complete
privatization/commercialization of public institutions, the competition is effective only
between the different segments of the private sector. In these scenarios, the
commercialized/privatized public agricultural extension will enter the market as part of
the consulting segment. This will result in increased competition between the existing
consulting firms and the new commercial or private organizations from the previously
public agricultural extension. It will also increase the overall competition in the market
between the consulting segment and other existing private providers (input suppliers,
processing firms, etc.). The competition between these different private providers,
according to Wolf, is important in the aspect of assuring the development and delivery
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of high quality informational services to producers, as well as continuous private
investment in this area resulting in continuous improvement over time.
Institutional Economic Analysis
This section develops the conceptual framework to analyze cost-recovery,
commercialization and privatization of agricultural extension using institutional economic
theory. The conceptual framework to analyze the role of institutions, transaction costs,
and public sector with regard to cost-recovery, commercialization and privatization is
provided.
Neoclassical versus Institutional Econom ics
The competitive model is used by neoclassical economists as a "benchmark"
against which to judge allocative efficiency in the real world (Klein). However, there
are exceptions like market failure situations, which are accepted by neoclassical economic
theory, but about which the theory does not provide guidance. The theory does not
provide much insight regarding the basis that the public sector should intervene to correct
the market failures. Especially, neoclassical theory does not accept that such decisions
should be made on non-economic grounds. Instead, it employs the cost-benefit analysis
to determine the role of public sector intervention.
The institutional economists, on the other hand, argue that for "the cost-benefits
analysis to be effective and feasible, it must be restricted to those costs and benefits that




not involve the incurring costs for future generations beyond the ability of current or
expected prices to encompass, or the incurring of benefits that (like defense) cannot
easily be captured by the valuation mechanisms enshrined in mainstream economics"
(Klein). Further, institutionalist argue about clogged information channels, distorted
signals, and inability of prices and costs to capture essential parts of the decision process,
and thus resulting in less than efficient resource allocation. They go further to say that
even regulation in regulated sectors of the economy results in less than efficient resource
allocation, since the regulated industries usually control the would-be regulators.
The Role of Institutions in Economic Development
Institutional economics puts institutional change at the heart of the long-run
process of economic development, providing the missing Iink between development and
growth (Srinivasan; Ruttan and Hayami). There are several definitions regarding
economic growth and development. However, economic growth is often conventionally
defined as the rate by which real per capita or output increases and economic
development as a process (technique) whereby the rate of increase in real per capita
income and output can be speeded up (Klein; Gordon; Meier; Mellor). Robinson
provides the following definitions: '" Economic growth' is defined as increases in
aggregate product, either total or per capita, without reference to changes in the structure
of the economy or in social and cultural value systems ... ", and "'Economic
development' is defined to include not only growth but also social and cultural changes






development as economic growth accompanied by "efficient" institutional change. Nabli
and Nugent (1989b) use the term "'efficient' institutional change" to account for
structural changes happening in the process of development. According to the theory,
the relationship between institutions and economic growth is a two-way relationship.
Economic growth can and frequently does influence changes in the institutions. On the
other hand, institutions affect the level and rate of econom ic growth (Nabl i and Nugent
1989b).
Economic growth may cause changes in contractual choices, the relative
importance and character of markets, the extent of private property rights, the relative
position and power of interest groups and organizations, technological choices, the costs
and benefits of internal monitoring and internationalization of the economy. With regard
to agricultural extension, commercialization of agricultural production, the increase in
the degree of specificity of agricultural information/technology, and development in input
and output markets are important factors affecting the decision to commercialize or make
private public agricultural extension.
Institutions, on the other hand, by affecting transactions costs and coordination
possibilities, can facilitate or retard economic growth. In addition, by affecting resource
mobility and the incentives for innovation and accumulation, institutions increase or
decrease economic efficiency in the allocation of resources and growth. Attempts to
commercial ize or make private public agricultural extension are based on the assumption
of a more efficient provision of these services by the private sector. Thus, the
institutional change under these circumstances is expected to help economic growth,
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although it should be noted that this is not the only effect of this institutional change.
Institutions also affect growth through their effects on expectations, social norms and
preferences. Also important is how efficiency is defined. A broader discussion of
efficiency will be done later in the chapter.
In studying the relationship between economic growth and institutions, Nabli and
Nugent (l989b) warn about the "efficiency of institutions" because institutions may not
always evolve "efficiently". Several studies have shown that institutional rigidities and
inertia in institutional adaptations can cause institutions to be inefficient (Basu, Jones, and
Schlicht; Stiglitz).
The Role of Transaction Costs in Institutional and Economic Change
According to institutional theory, transaction costs are a very important factor in
determining institutional change. Based on "our present knowledge at least, transaction
costs would seem to contribute very substantially to the determination of both institutions
and technology" (Nabli and Nugent 1989a). In a dynamic setting where technology can
change, there will be transaction costs involved in gaining access to the new technology
and in affecting the relevant agents to adapt their behavior so as to accommodate these
changes.
"Market only" or private services exist in a world where barriers abound such as
1) exclusion of certain groups, 2) high transactions costs, 3) incomplete information, and
4) biased information. Public institutions, in part, can reduce barriers. Likewise, private
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groups can be regulated to provide lower barriers. Overcoming these barriers is costly
and so too, is ignoring them.
In the case of agricultural extension, the question is what happens to the relevant
institutions and the use of agricultural extension services as transaction costs change?
How do behavior and outcomes differ? To whom will the benefits accrue: to the general
public, to the individual farmer, or a combination of both? If individuals do not capture
all the benefits, will there be an undersupply of agricultural extension services and a less
efficient economy than would have been otherwise?
Role of the Public Sector
Concerning the role of the public sector, Klein states: "Institutionalism appears
to reserve for the public sector two critical tasks. The first is to monitor the allocative
results flowing from private markets and consider their implications for total allocation.
The second is to create some resources for allocation and to directly undertake and direct
some part of the allocating". It is true that the public sector performs both functions in
all market-oriented economies to a significant extent. Institutional economics is
concerned about the efficiency of the public sector in assuring that the economy plays
its part in shaping and channeling as well as transmitting the ongoing values of its
participants, or as Klein calls these values, "the collective thought".
According to this theory it is impossible to utilize private markets and individual
reaction to prices to reflect "the collective thought". Further, "the collective thought"
is not simply the distinction between public and private goods, but much more. For the
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institutionalist, the economy should fully inform its participants about alternatives, and
fully transmit the changing values of its participants throughout the system. Thus, the
concept of efficiency in the economy is reflected in two important aspects: first, the
accurate reflecting and correct channeling and reporting of the emergent values; and
secondly, the development and transmission of these emergent values.
In regard to the first aspect, neoclassical economics treats the notion of efficiency
as a mere input-output mechanism, with increased output per constant inputs as a
measure of greater efficiency in production and hence an increase in productivity. For
institutional economics, efficiency and productivity are more complicated as they are
related to the path along which economic activity moves through time, rather than simply
what emerges as the allocational result of market price formation.
The second aspect, the development and transmission of the emergent values, is
concerned about the movement of the economy through time. According to institutional
theory, this movement involves progress, or movement in chosen directions, rather than
growth, or a mere quantitative increase over time. Institutional economists argue that
economic theory needs to take more explicitly into account the process of choosing
directions as well as the speed the economy moves on the chosen directions. The path-
choosing process is the heart of ongoing economic activity, as opposed to mere market
activity.
In other words, "efficiency in the broader sense" does not mean the lowest cost
means to get goods and services to consumers. The public may have a greater sense of








competitive pricing mechanisms. Neoclassical economists likely stress the narrow view
of efficiency, a view which has led to problems such as degradation of the environment
and the growth of poverty. According to institutionalist, public institutions are more
likely to consider problems involving pollution, conservation, and quality of life. Thus,
as these needs and problems evolve, they can, through the public institutions, be
weighted more highly in the "higher efficiency" (more inclusive understanding of
efficiency).
Regarding the U.S. case, as discussed earlier, the U.S. CES responded to the
challenges by advancing a new set of issues-oriented initiatives designed to revitalize the
relevance of the system (Rivera 1991a). Attempts to broaden the set of issues and
clientele intend to offset the dwindling number of people directly involved in production
agriculture. U.S. CES is also attempting to broaden the public good nature of its
services through programs directed at communities, environmental pollution, etc.
Considering the example of pollution, it can be viewed as a need to change a certain
service to a new service, which results in "higher efficiency". This means that the old
service would be removed. There are two aspects related to this change. First, there
is an institutional constraint involving the reluctancy of changing the old institutional
behavior and structure. In addition, there is resistance by the users of the service not to
remove the service. The second aspect involves, in the example, environmentalists'
concern and increased public awareness related to environment degradation. The latter
could serve as means for affecting the decision to replace the old service with the new






This is the reason why the role of the public sector is so important. As Klein
states, "it is through the public sector that we monitor economic performance and so
assess the gap between the ability of the economy to express 'the collective thought'
through private markets and the need to express it through the public sector". Market
prices do playa role, but only part of the role. The "higher" efficiency of an economy
involves far more than a simple examination of market prices in resource allocation.
In addition, according to economic theory, the homogeneity of community
preferences and their translation into social values is an important factor in determining
the efficiency of an economy. It is recognized that community preferences are more
easily homogenized when 80-90% of the population is rural and/or farming. On the other
hand, they are not so easily homogenized when less than 5% of the population is rural
and even a smaller percentage is farming. Institutional economists argue that any
economic mechanism, including prices, is imperfect in transmitting community
preferences into social values. They conclude that, by playing an interactive role in the
dynamic process of transmitting values, the public sector's purpose should be reducing
these imperfections.
Other characteristics of an economy, besides efficiency, are equity, freedom,
security, and compassion. Institutional economists argue that equity as part of the
institutional structure will change over time. They are concerned whether the economy
is so structured as to reflect or to hinder and obstruct the changing attitude toward equity
of access to the available resources that emerges over time. In the case of agricultural
extension, the question would be: What. does the economy give up as it moves from a
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public funded "highercalling" agricultural extension service to a privately funded one?
What will happen to small farmer needs, nutrition programs, prenatal care, and small
rural communities preferences as a result of such move? Will the market express these
needs and preferences?
Summary
This chapter provides the theoretical framework to analyze the move toward cost-
recovery, commercial ization, and privatization from both the neoclassical and institutional
perspective. Using neoclassical economics, the categories of public/private goods and
services are defined based on the criteria of excludability and rivalry (subtractability).
The services and information provided by agricultural extension, may be classified in
different categories based on their public/private good features. In addition, the structure
of the market for agricultural extension services and its evolution is discussed.
Using institutional economics, the role of institutions in the process of economic
development is discussed. Also the role of transaction costs is described. Finally, the
framework to analyze the role of the public sector in the economy and particularly, with
regard to the provision of agricultural extension services, is presented.
Hypotheses
This research will investigate the following hypotheses:
1) Cost-recovery, commercialization, and privatization attempts will result in
fewer farmers being reached by agricultural extension. The biggest reduction in the
number of farmers will be in the category of small farmers.
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2) Cost recovery, commercial ization and privatization of agricultural extension
will result in less provision of the public good nature agricultural information.
3) Cost-recovery, commercialization, and privatization attempts will result in
increased competition in the private market for agricultural extension services. In the
case of commercial ization and privatization, market share of the private providers already
in the market will decrease as the commercialized/privatized public agricultural extension






This chapter describes the methodology used to analyze the implications of the
cost-recovery schemes and commercialization and privatization approaches concerning
publ ic agricultural extension. The chapter starts with an explanation of the case study
,
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research. Some countries are selected for case studies for each of the three scenarios:
discussed. The main areas of investigation are outlined. In addition, the indicators for
which information will be collected are presented. Also, how the collected information
The organization of theprivatization, commercialization, and cost-recovery.
questionnaire prepared to collect information regarding the phenomenon of interest is also
will be used is explained. Finally, the sources of the information are discussed.
The Case Study Research
This section starts with a definition of case study research. The section then
continues describing the most important components to be considered in a case study
research. These components include: 1) case study design; 2) selection of cases; and 3)
producing generalizations.
Stake defines the case study research as "the study of the particularity and
complexity of a single case, coming to understand its activity within important
circumstances". Yin (1981a, 1981b) defines the case study research as "an empirical
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inquiry that: investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when
the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which
multiple sources of evidence are used".
Categories of Case Study
According to Yin (1989), there are two main categories of case studies: single-
case studies and multiple-case studies. For each of these categories there are two
subcategories. The first subcategory is the case study with one unit of analysis, or as the
author refers to it, holistic case study. The second is the case study with multiple units
of analysis, or the embedded case study. Thus, there are four types of case study
designs: 1) single-case holistic design; 2) single-case embedded design; 3) multiple-case
holistic design; and, 4) multiple-case embedded design.
The single-case study is an appropriate design under certain circumstances. First,
it can be used when it represents the critical case in testing a well-formulated theory (the
theory has specified a clear set of propositions as well as the circumstances within which
the propositions are believed to be true), when there exists a single case that meets all
the conditions to test the theory's propositions. Second, this design is used when the
case represents an extreme or unique case. This applies for situations or phenomena
which are very rare. Third, the single-case study can be used when facing a revelatory
case. This situation occurs when a researcher has an opportunity to observe and analyze





Other situations require a multiple-ease design. Multiple-case designs have
distinct advantages and disadvantages in comparison to single-case designs. The evidence
from multiple cases is often considered more compelling, and the overall study is
therefore regarded as more robust. On the other hand, the rationaJe for single-case
designs cannot be satisfied by multiple cases. The situations where the single-case
designs are used, by definition, involve only single cases. Moreover, the conduct of a
multiple-case study can require extensive resources and time, compared to a single-case
study.
A very important aspect of the multiple-case studies, which should be carefully
considered, is the replication logic versus the sampling logic. Yin (1989) stresses that
the logic used in multiple-case studies should be the replication logic, not the sampling
logic. In addition, Hersen and Barlow explain that the replication logic is analogous to
that used in multiple experiments. According to the sampling logic, a number of subjects
is assumed to "represent" a larger pool of subjects, so that data from a smaller number
of subjects are assumed to represent the data that might have been collected from the
entire pool. On the contrary, based on replication logic, each individual case study
consists of a "whole" study, in which convergent evidence is sought regarding the facts
and conclusions for the case. Each case's conclusions are then considered to be the
information needing replication by other individual cases.
There are also differences between holistic case studies and embedded case
studies. The holistic case study involves only one unit of analysis, while the embedded
case study may involve one or more subunits. Each of these subcategories has its
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strengths and weaknesses. The holistic design is advantageous when no logical subunits
can be identified and when the relevant theory underlying the case study is itself of a
holistic nature. Potential problems arise, however, when a global approach allows a
researcher to avoid examining any specific phenomenon in operational detail. On the
other hand, one of the major weaknesses of the embedded design is when the case study
focuses only on the subunit level and fails to return to the larger unit of analysis.
Another classification of the case studies, according to Stake, is the following: 1)
single case study; 2) collective case study. The single case study has two subcategories:
1a) intrinsic case study, and Ib) instrumental case study. The collective case study only
involves several instrumental case studies. The single and collective case study are
similar to the single and multiple case studies described above. A case study is said to
be intrinsic when the case, which is the object to be studied, is given. In this situation,
the purpose is not to learn about other cases or some general problem by studying the
case, but to learn about this particular case. A case study is said to be instrumental when
there is a research question, a need for general understand ing, that a researcher might
get insight into, by studying this particular case. The case study here is instrumental to
accomplishing something other than understanding this particular case.
Selection of Cases
Concerning the next component of a case study research, the selection of cases,
two issues are of importance. The first issue is the number of cases to be selected. To
decide the number of cases, Yin (1989) uses the analogy with the statistical studies in the
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selection of the criterion for establishing levels of significance. "Much as the choice of
"p < .05" or "p < .01" is not derived from any formula but is a matter of discretionary,
judgmental choice, the selection of number of replications depends upon the certainty the
researcher wants to have about the results of the research (as with the higher criterion
for establishing statistical significance, the greater certainty lies with larger number of
cases)" (Yin 1989).
The second issue involves criteria used in choosing the cases. According to
Stake, the first criterion to be used should be the maximization of what the researcher
can learn from the selected case. Further, Stake stresses the need to pick cases which
are easy to get to and hospitable to the inquiry, cases for which a prospective informant
can be identified and with actors willing to comment on certain draft materials. Also,
important is to carefully consider the uniqueness and contexts of the alternative
selections, as these may aid or restrict the research.
Drawing General izations
The third component of case study research consists of drawing generalizations.
In case study research involving one or several cases being studied certain activities or
problems or responses will come up again and again. Thus, based on this process,
certain generalizations will be drawn. But, it is important to understand, as Stake
explains, an entirely new understanding is seldom reached, but a refinement of an
understanding is. In other words, a generalization is increasingly refined, not as a new



















This research is organized as a multiple-case study research, according to Yin
(1989), or as a collective case study research, according to Stake, as the study involves
several case studies. The case studies are the countries selected to be investigated. In
addition, this research is designed as an holistic case study, because it involves one unit
of analysis. The unit of analysis consists of national agricultural extension systems of
the countries selected as case studies. Based on the classification by Stake, this research
is an instrumental case study research, as the cases included in the study are used as a
means in understanding the implications of a process, the privatization/commercial ization
of agricultural extension.
Alternative ways of financing agricultural extension services include: 1)
introduction of the cost-recovery schemes; 2) commercialization of agricultural extension;
and 3) privatization of agricultural extension. Thus, several countries in different stages
of the transferring process were selected as the case studies. The cost-recovery schemes
have been implemented in several Latin American countries. Latin American countries
selected for this research included Mexico, Chile, and Venezuela. In addition, cost-
recovery schemes have been implemented in lreland and the United Kingdom.
Concerning commercialization of agricultural extension, countries selected were New
Zealand and Australia. Finally, to investigate the privatization of agricultural extension
the following countries were selected: The Netherlands and France.
The following approach was used to collect the information from the selected
countries. First, a contact person was established for each country. The national
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agricultural extension organizations (public, commercial, or half-privatized) were
approached and contact was established with the person(s) able to provide the required
information. The prepared questionnaire was faxed and so were the responses from
contact persons. In Mexico where the transformation process that is of interest to this
research was implemented only regionally, the regional agricultural extension
organization was contacted. In the next section the preparation of the questionnaire will
be explained in detail.
Collection of Data4
A questionnaire was prepared to collect data. The questionnaire was customized
for the three different approaches: cost-recovery, commercialization, and privatization.
Only minor technical and editorial changes were done according to the approach for
which the questionnaire was prepared.
The questionnaire was constructed in such way as to collect information for three
periods. The three periods are: 1) the period before the change (cost-recovery,
commercialization, or privatization); 2) the period right after the change; and 3) the
present situation. The period before the change was designated as one year before the
respective change, while the period right after the change was designated as one year
after the change.
The questionnaire starts with a question to clarify the year when the change
started to be implemented and a general question about the farm classification system
4A copy of the questionnaire prepared for this purpose can be found in Appendix A
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used in each country. The next section of the questionnaire addresses three important
areas to be investigated. Those three areas were: 1) the cl ientele reached by the
agricultural extension; 2) the type of services provided by the agricultural extension; and
3) the respective fees charged for the services provided. Also information regarding
changes over time in these areas, as a result of the respective change, was requested.
The next section of the questionnaire concerns the structure of the market for
agricultural extension services. The purpose of this section was to investigate the
structure of the private sector providers of the agricultural extension services, other than
the currently commercialized/privatized public sector, in the case of commercialization
and privatization. Questions included were those regarding the number of firms for each
type of the private providers of agricultural extension services in the market, and their
respective share of the market. The questionnaire collects information about variations
in these indicators over time, as a result of the transformation process.
In addition to the role of the private sector, the role of the publ ic sector In
providing agricultural extension services and changes in this role through the period
involved in the study were being investigated. Areas being investigated include the
number of personnel in the public and private sector and the public and private expenses
for providing agricultural extension services. An important aspect of the role of the
public sector addressed in the questionnaire was the impact of government policies before
and during the transferring process. This section of the questionnaire concerned the











context, the government policies affecting the start or the implementation process of the
transformation were being investigated.
Finally, the questionnaire ends with questions about some other factors that
influence the transfer of resources from the public sector to the private sector. Also
descriptive questions about the original objective of the change and modification of this
objective as implementation takes place as well as other comments were included.
The Processing of the Information
The information collected with the questionnaire from the selected countries was
analyzed as information collected on a multiple-case study research. This means that
first each case was analyzed separately, and conclusions were drawn upon the available
information. In the second step, generalizations will be drawn for each of the three types
of transformation: the cost-recovery scheme, commercialization, and privatization. For
this purpose, all the cases belonging to each of the three types of transformation were
analyzed together resulting in joint conclusions and generalizations.
This research was based heavily on theoretical evaluation of the phenomenon of
interest, the transfer of resources for agricultural extension from the public sector to the
private sector. Several countries were selected as case studies in order to collect
practical information regarding the above phenomenon. The analysis of such information
was expected to test hypotheses raised by this research, as well as conclusions drawn









The primary use of information was for descriptive purposes. The collected
information was used to identify changes in variables like the extent and type of clientele,
services, and fees as a result of the application of cost-recovery, commercialization, or
privatization schemes. In addition, the same information was used to analyze the effect
of the aforementioned schemes in improving the coverage level and effectiveness of
agricultural extension systems. This was accomplished by comparing the situation before
and after the implementation of the alternative way of financing agricultural extension
in each of the countries that were selected for analysis.
In addition to the public-private nature of agricultural extension, another aspect
that was explored was the institutional aspect. Relating to this issue the role of certain
institutions and institutional rules in the efficient provision of publ ic agricultural
extension services was investigated. The case studies were used to identify certain
institutions under differing country/agricultural circumstances that have positively
affected the public/private provision of agricultural extension services. These institutions
might include different forms of farmers' associations as well as the nongovernmental
organ izations.
Sources of Information
The pnmary source of information for this research will be the responses
provided to the questionnaire sent to the agricultural extension organizations in the
selected countries. This source of information was considered credible since considerable











within national (regional) agricultural extension organization for each country. In
addition, for some countries it was possible to confirm and substantiate the information
collected by comparing it with similar information collected by previous research.
Another source of information was the FAO Directorate of National Extension
Organizations, as well as other sources of information provided by agricultural extension
organizations in the selected countries. Several limitations were expected at the
beginning of this research. This research involved a number of countries and it was
expected to be difficult to locate the right contact persons who would be able to provide
the required information. Another limitation was the limited time and resources to
conduct this research. Also, since some of the information required concerns the private
sector, there was some doubt about the availability of such data, especially for
developing countries.
Summary
In this chapter the case study research was defined. The categories of case studies
were also described. These include: 1) single-case holistic design; 2) single-case
embedded design; 3) multiple-case holistic design; and, 4) multiple-case embedded
design. In addition, the criteria for selecting the cases were discussed, as well as the
process of producing generalizations based on the case studies investigated.
The chapter also described the design of the research. The selection of the cases
to be investigated was discussed. Then, the organization of the questionnaire was
described. Important areas to be studied were identified. They include: 1) the clientele
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reached by the agricultural extension; 2) the type of services provided by the agricultural
extension; and 3) the respective fees charged for the services provided. Finally, how the
collected information was processed to draw generatizations was discussed. Also. the






This chapter presents and interprets information collected from the country cases
selected for this research. The country cases are grouped together based 011 the
transformation approach implemented In the country, respectively, cost recovery,
commercialization and privatization. For each approach studied in this research,
information collected from selected country cases is presented and interpreted separately.
The analysis of country cases is constructed based on the hypotheses stated in Chapter
3. These hypotheses concern the effects of the transformation approaches on three
aspects of interest: 1) the extent and type of clientele reached by agricultural extension
services, 2) services provided by agricultural extension organizations, and 3) structure
of the market for agricultural extension services. Also, additional information regarding
other areas of investigation, like the role of the public sector in the transformation
process, is presented and interpreted.
Cost-recovery
Cost recovery schemes by definition include different options being pursued to
reduce the total and/or unit costs of providing public agricultural extension services.
Cost-recovery schemes are implemented in several developing countries in Latin America





the United Kingdom. From the countries selected for this research it was only possible
to collect information regarding the Mexican, Irish and British cases. Analysis of these
situations will be presented in the following sections. Information about the case of Chile
and Venezuela was not collected. The transformation process in these two countries
included a long time (18 years in the case of Chile). The limited resources for this
research could not provide for the collection of this information.
Mexico's Case
The agricultural sector in Mexico employs 26.9% of working population and
accounts for 7% of the Gross Domestic Product (GOP). The industrial sector accounts
for 24.8% of GOP (United Nations).
In Mexico, the cost recovery attempts tend to stratify producers by income level
and progressively orient higher income producers toward private agricultural extension
services, or a larger share of the cost is required if they continue to require publ ic
agricultural extension services. The information collected from the survey covers the
period from 1994 to present and only few regions of the country. These regions are
Coahuila, Nuevo Leon, Tamaulipas, Chihuahua, Durango, Zacatecas, and San Luis
Potosi.
Results of the Survey
In the case of Mexico farms are classified in categories small, medium, and large
as follows. Small farms include farms for communal use with an area of agricultural
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land less than 10 ha and range land between 1,000 and 5,000 ha mostly for goats.
Medium farms include farms of private ownership with an area of agricultural land
between 10 and 50 ha and more than 1,000 ha of range land for sheep and horses. Large
farms include farms of private ownership with an area of agricultural land of more than
50 ha and more than 3,000 ha of range land for sheep and cattle.
Information Regarding Hypothesis 1
The total number of farmers reached by agricultural extension services dropped
from 10,200 one year before cost recovery to 5,100 in the present a 50% reduction
(Table 3). Data about the total number of farmers for the regions included in the study
were not available.
TABLE III
NUMBER OF FARMERS REACHED BY AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION



















The number of farmers for each category has changed as follows. The number
of small farmers is reduced from 4,800 before cost recovery to 3,060 one year after the
cost recovery to 2,550 at present. The number of medium farmers for the same periods
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is reduced from 4,080 to 2,040 to 1,530. While the number of large farmers is reduced
from 2,040 before cost recovery to 1,020 one year after and also at present.
As a result of the cost recovery the number of small farmers reached is reduced
by 47 %, the number of medium farmers reached is reduced by 62 % and the number of
large farmers reached is reduced by 50 %. An important reason for the reduction in the
total number of farmers reached could be the reduction in government expenditures and
in the number of agricultural extension personnel of the public agricultural extension.
Regarding the medium and large farmers, the reason for the reduction of number of
farmers in these categories would appear to Iie in one of the objectives of the cost
recovery attempts, the gradual transfer of these categories of farmers to the private sector
agricultural extension. Meanwhile, the reduction in the number of small farmers reached
supports the hypothesis that the introduction of fees for services previously offered free
of charge will result in the decrease of the number of small farmers reached.
Information Regarding Hypothesis 2
Services provided before the cost recovery included: 1) public technical
assistance; 2) agricultural and livestock insurance; 3) production subsidi.es; 4) credit; 5)
field employment; 6) seed support; 7) civil support (harvesting, road construction, tillage,
etc.); 8) grazing land rehabilitation; 9) feeding during droughts (hay, oats, etc.); 10)
training; 11) medical service; 12) weB drilling support; 13) household support; 14)
production stimulus; 15) reforestation; 16) best producer awards; 17) expert assistance;





SERVICES PROVIDED BY AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION
IN THE REGIONS OF MEXICO INCLUDED IN THE STUDY
Services Provided by Before Cost- Present
Agricultural Extension recovery (1996)
(1994)
Public technical assistance Yes No
Agricultural and livestock insurance Yes No
Production subsidies Yes No ~ ...
~fCredit Yes Yes
;a..
Field employment Yes Yes ~I
~...
Seed support Yes Yes J
1




Grazing land rehabilitation Yes Yes
Feeding during droughts (hay, oats, etc.) Yes Yes
Training Yes No
Medical service Yes Yes
Well drilling support Yes Yes
Household support Yes Yes
Production stimulus Yes No
Reforestation Yes Yes
Best producer awards Yes No
Expert assistance Yes Yes
Range appraisals Yes Yes
Buildings construction No Yes
Inputs programs No Yes
Private technical assistance No Yes
Investment project assistance No Yes
Commercial ization project assistance No Yes
Bad loan (credit) rescue (recovery) No Yes
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During the transformation period several services were added. These services
include: 1) buildings construction; 2) inputs programs; 3) private technical assistance; 4)
investment project assistance; 5) commercialization project assistance; and 6) bad credit
(loan) rescue (recovery). During the same period the following services were removed:
1) production credit; 2) insurance reduction; 3) public technical assistance; 4) production
stimulus; 5) producers awards; and 6) training.
Some of the services added during the period of investigation were services for
which a fee could be charged since they feature characteristics of the private goods.
These services included: 1) road and buildings construction; 2) inputs programs; 3)
private technical assistance; 4) investment project assistance; 5) commercialization project
assistance; and 6) bad credit (loan) rescue (recovery). At the same time several services
of a public good nature were removed. These services were: 1) production credit; 2)
insurance reduction; 3) public technical assistance; 4) production stimulus; 5) producers
awards; and 6) training. These changes in the type of services provided support the
hypothesis that introduction of fee-for-servtce schemes will result in an increased
emphasis on services for which a fee can be charged and less emphasis on services of
public good nature.
Information Regarding Hypothesis 3
The cost recovery attempt resulted in changes in the structure of the market for




STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN THE MARKET FOR PRIVATE
AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION IN SEVERAL REGIONS IN MEXICO
Private Number of Companies Market Share (%)
Providers
Before Cost- Present Before Cost- Present
recovery (1994) (1996) recovery (1994) (1996)










1 2 3 4 )
Firms 1
I
Agro- 2 2 2 2
marketing
Firms
Farmer 15 15 2 4
Organizations
NGOs 6 3 6 5
Two biggest private providers of agricultural extension services are the
agricultural input suppliers and the agro-processors. The number of agricultural input
suppliers remained constant at 10 during the period of investigation while their share of
the market first decreased from 8 % before cost recovery to 6 % one year after, and
increased after that to 7 % at present. The number of the agro-processing companies also
remained constant at 5. Their share of the market increased from 10% before
commercialization to 12 % one year after and remained constant since then. An
important change which is consistent with the theoretical expectations discussed in
Chapter 3 is the change regarding the consulting firms. From one consulting firm before
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cost recovery there are two firms at present. Also, the share of the market for the
consulting firms increased from 3 % before cost recovery to 4 % at present. The number
of agro-marketing firms remained constant at 2 throughout the period of investigation and
so did their share of the market at 2 %. The number of farmers' organizations remained
constant at 15 while their share of the market increased from 2% before cost recovery
to 4 % at present. The number of NGOs decreased from 6 to 3 and their share of the
market from 6 % to 5 %.
Looking at the effect of the cost recovery on the private providers of agricultural
extension services the general trend was that the market share of several private providers
of agricultural extension services is increased. Thus, the market share for the agro-
processors is increased from 10% to 12 % and the market share for farmers'
organizations from 2 % to 4 %. In addition, the market share of consulting firms is
increased from 3 % to 4 %, and from one consulting firm there are now two such firms
providing services in the regions included in the study. Even though the market share
for the agricultural input suppliers first decreased, it subsequently increased. The NGOs
lost 1% of the market share, but there was also a reduction in the number of NGOs from
6 to 3.
In addition, indicators regarding the number of compames and agricultural
extension personnel in the private sector showed an increased involvement of private
sector in the provision of agricultural extension services. Thus, the number of companies












investigation. Also, the number of agricultural extension personnel in the private sector
is increased from 50 to 180.
These changes in the structure of the private market for agricultural extension are
consistent with the theoretical expectations and the hypothesis of this study discussed in
Chapter 3. Introduction of fees for services previously offered for free serves as an
incentive for greater involvement of the private sector in the provision of agricultural
extension services. In total, the market share of the private sector increases from 31 %
to 34%.
Additional Information
Government expenditures for agricultural extension were reduced from US$
2,500,000 before cost recovery to US$ 1,900,000 one year after. At present there is a
slight increase to US$ 1,950,000. The number of agricultural extension personnel in the
public sector is reduced from 10,000 before cost recovery to 8,000 one year after to
6,000 at present. Government policies implemented during the period of investigation
include: 1) extension of loan payments; 2) devaluation of peso; 3) forgive overdue
interests; 4) partial forgiveness of principal payments; 5) control of inflation; 6) support
of machinery and input purchase; 7) economic stimulus of production; 8) technical
assistance for farmers with bad credit (a lot of debt); 9) liberalization of the price
control; and 10) flexibility in seed imports.
Looking at government policies implemented during the period of investigation,




control regarding agricultural prices, production and imports. Second, to help farmers,
especially those farmers with bad credit and a lot of debt, loan repayment periods were
extended, overdue interest forgiven and principal owed written down. The reduction of
the financial burdens of the farmers intended to increase the farmers effective demand
for the "fee-for-service" type of services. Thus, through these policies the government
was also trying to facilitate private sector involvement in the provision of agricultural
extension services.
Ireland's Case
The agricultural sector in Ireland employs 13.7% of working population and
accounts for 7% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The industrial sector accounts
for 30.7% of GOP (United Nations).
In 1980, reforms were initiated to integrate the advisory and formal training
functions of the Ministry of Agriculture with the advisory and education functions of the
County Committees of Agriculture (27 of these) within a single structure. Thus, a public
organization, the Agricultural Development Authority (ACOT), was set up. This was
a statutory organization with a Board that had representatives of farm organizations and
the Mi.nistries of Agriculture and Education.
In 1987, charges for services were introduced. The intention was to keep prices








In 1988, the government decided to amalgamate ACOT and the public
organization in charge of research, thus setting up a new public body called TEAGASC
("teaching" in Irish) - the Agricultural and Food Development Authority. This operation
was part of a policy to reduce the number of public bodies with the aim of saving money
by pooling general services. TEAGASC is fully responsible for the research, training
and advisory services for Irish agriculture and food industries.
Results of the Survey
Information Regarding Hypothesis 1
Looking first at the number of farmers reached by agricultural extension services,
the total number of farmers reached changed from 72,635 before the introduction of cost-
recovery to 63,100 in 1993, a reduction of over 13 % (Table 6).
TABLE VI
NUMBER OF FARMERS IN THE IRELAND AND NUMBER
OF FARMERS REACHED BY AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION





















5According to the survey response, the classification used after 1991 may not be
directly compatible with earlier years.
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However, the change of the total number of farmers does not explain what
happened to different categories of farmers. The number of small farmers reached was
decreased from 30,332 to 18,000, with this reduction being 29% larger than the
reduction of the total number of farmers. In addition, the number of medium farmers
reached decreased from 31,723 to 30,000, or about 18% of the total reduction. In the
meantime, the number of large farmers reached has increased from 10,580 to 15,100,
an increase of over 47%. The increase of the number of larger farmers offset the
decrease in the number of small and medium farmers, resulting in a lower reduction
figure for the total number of farmers.
The move toward cost-recovery resulted in a reduction of the clientele reached
by agricultural extension services, particularly small farmers. The trend of the change
can be analyzed by comparing the period before cost-recovery and the present situation.
The number of small farmers is reduced by more than 40% and the number of medium
farmers by 5 %. The information above supports the hypothesis stated at Chapter 3 that
the introduction of fees for services previously provided free of charge limits the access
of small and medium farmers to such services.
Information Regarding Hypothesis 2
An important part of survey concerned the type of services provided by
agricultural extension and changes in these services as a result of the introduction of cost-







SERVICES PROVIDED BY AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION IN IRELAND
Services Provided by Before Cost- Present
Agricultural Extension recovery (1993)
(1984)
Advice on development of farm Yes Yes
Farm buildings design and planning Yes Yes
Milking machine testing Yes Yes :..
Milk quality advice Yes Yes ~~
Participation in development schemes Yes Yes ~J..
~,
Crop monitoring Yes Yes
Development of grazing systems Yes Yes
Farm business management Yes Yes
Enterprise analysis and management Yes Yes
Animal health Yes Yes
Forage analysis Yes Yes
Socio-economic service Yes No
Annual membership No Yes
Annual membership & farm visits No Yes
Farm accounts & taxation returns Yes No
Mastitis control program No Yes
Farm buildings design and planning using CAD No Yes
Farm nutrient profile No Yes
Skills training - sheep No Yes
Sprayer testing & training of operators No Yes
Herd breeding and fertility No Yes
Least cost ration formulation No Yes
On farm discussion groups No Yes
Rural environment protection scheme planning No Yes
(REPS)
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Services provided before the introduction of cost-recovery measures included: 1)
advice on development of farm; 2) farm buildings design and planning; 3) milking
machine testing; 4) milk quality advice; 5) participation in development schemes; 6) crop
monitoring; 7) development of grazing systems; 8) farm business management; 9)
enterprise analysis and management; 10) animal health; 11) forage analysis; and 12)
socio-economic service. In addition, new services were added during the transformation
period. These included: 1) annual membership (membership provides for a limited
package of services for an annual fee); 2) annual membership and farm visits; 3) farm
accounts and taxation returns; 4) mastitis control program; 5) farm buildings design and
planning using CAD; 6) farm nutrient profile; 7) skills training - sheep; 8) sprayer testing
and training of operators; 9) herd breeding and fertility; 10) least cost ration formulation;
11) on-farm discussion groups; and 12) rural environment protection scheme planning
(REPS). From this package of services only two were removed during this period, 1)
socio-economic service (1993); and 2) farm accounts and taxation returns (1995).
Regarding the services offered, the cost recovery attempt did not cause important
changes in the package of services provided by public agricultural extension. Since the
service itself remained of public ownership, services of public good nature were still
provided. In the meantime, several other services were added to the original package.
Most of these new services were services for which a fee is charged. The increase in
revenues from these services implies that there was a tendency to emphasize those
services for which the user contributes to the cost of providing the service. In addition,







extension personnel implied that the importance of services of a more public good nature
is diminished even though same number of these services was still provided.
Concerning the fees charged for the services provided, fees were based on the
following units of charge. For the package of services provided before the introduction
of cost-recovery, fees were US$32 for a farm visit (2 hours) and US$16 per hour for
office consultations, office planning or follow up. Typical fee charged was about US$80
per annum. However, at present (1996) these fees are as follows: farm visit US$96 and
office consultation US$48. The typical fee charged is US$288 (2 farm visits). Special
discounts for smaller farmers reduce this charge to US$112-192, depending on the size
of farm business. For services added during the transformation period there was a
US$96 annual membership fee which covered services like telephone contact, meetings,
on-farm demonstrations, newsletters and magazines, plus a US$48 fee per farm visit for
members. The typical annual fee charged was US$192. A separate fee was charged for
REPS (item 12), with US$320 for a REPS plan for 40 ha farm. At present, the annual
membership fee is changed to US$160 and the fee for farm visit to US$64. The fee for
a REPS plan for 40 ha is changed to US$720.
Information Regarding Hypothesis 3
The structure of the market for agricultural extension has also changed during the
period of investigation. The number of private providers of agricultural extension is
small and so is their share of the market (Table 8).
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TABLE VIII
STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN THE MARKET FOR PRIVATE
AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION IN IRELAND
Private Number of Companies Market Share (%)
Providers
Before Cost- Present Before Cost- Present
recovery (1986) (1996) recovery (1986) (1996)
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Farmer 3 3 <1 <1
Organizations
NGOs
Before cost recovery the private sector accounted for only about 23 % of the
market with the market being dominated by public sector. Market share of the private
sector has decreased to 11 % one year after the cost recovery and to 10% at present.
Two biggest private providers are the agricultural input suppliers and the agro-
processors. The 12 agricultural input suppliers accounted for 10-12 % of the market
before cost recovery. However, both the number of agricultural input suppliers and their
share of the market have decreased. In 1993 10 agricultural input suppliers had 7 % of
the market. At present, 8 agricultural input suppliers occupy 6 % of the market. The




the market of 5-8 %, these numbers reduced to 5 and 2 % in 1993 and to 5 and Jess than
2 % at present. However, the number of firms and market share for the consulting firms
is slightly increased. The 6 consulting firms accounted for less than 2 % of the market
before cost recovery. These numbers changed to 8 firms and 2 % of the market in 1993,
and to 8 firms with more than 2 % of the market at present. Another less important
segment of the private sector, farmers' organizations, mai ntained a constant number of
companies at 3 and a constant share of the market at less than 1% throughout the period
of the investigation.
The results of the survey regarding structural changes in the market for
agricultural extension services showed a reduction in the market share of two private
providers, agricultural input suppliers and agro-processors, and an increase of the market
share for the consultancy firms. The reasons for the decline of the market share of the
agricultural input suppliers and agro-processors are not clear based on the information
available from the survey. An important fact to be noticed was the reduction in the
number of companies for each of these two types of private providers. This reduction
in the number of companies might have accounted for the decl ine in market share.
However, the scenario for the consulting firms can be better explained. As discussed
earl ier, the introduction of fees serves as an incentive for private sector involvement in
agricultural extension provision. This is true especially for the consulting firms. In the
case of Ireland, a big increase in the private agricultural extension provision happened
with regard to such services that are provided by the public sector and for which a fee





The number of public agricultural extension personnel before the cost-recovery
attempt (1986) was 490 agents. One year after the introduction of the cost-recovery
(1988) it reduced to 340 agents, and at the present (1996) is 350 agents. The
government expenditures for providing agricultural extension services before cost-
recovery were at US$32.2 million. One year after the cost-recovery the government
expenditures were reduced to a net of US$25.6 million, or a gross expense of US$27.2
million less US$1.6 million of revenue generated by fees. At present the expenditure
level is US$20 million net or US$28 million of gross expense less US$8 million of
revenue from fees.
There were two policy aspects that have affected the cost-recovery process. First,
the 1992/93 major reform of Common Agricultural Policy by European Union which had
an over riding influence on Irish Agricultural policy. Second, the introduction in 1994
of the Rural Environment Protection Scheme (REPS) which provided income support for




The Case of the United Kingdom6
The agricultural sector in the United Kingdom employs 2.2 % of working
population and accounts for 1.6% of the Gross Domestic Product (GOP). The industrial
sector accounts for 23.3% of GDP (United Nations).
In the United Kingdom, agricultural development is the responsibility of the
Agricultural Development and Advisory Service (ADAS) organized under the Ministry
of Agriculture and created in 1972. The public agency, ADAS, is responsible for both
research and agricultural extension. Up to 1987, ADAS furnished free advice to
farmers. Following the reduction of public finding the organization changed its
approach, becoming commercial and billing its services to the users. Fees, on a time
cost basis, are introduced for certain services that were previously offered free of charge.
Charging for the services originally was intended for the recovery of costs, but this goal
has since evolved into the objective to transfer a complete section of the government
advisory services into the private sector. According to personal contacts with people
working with ADAS, the complete privatization of the agency is supposed to happen by
April 1997. The current status of the ADAS, being in the process of privatization, made
6In Chapter 2, the case of the United Kingdom is discussed under the scenario of
privatization. There are two reasons for that. First, to be consistent with the
classification of the cases in the existing literature. Second, the final objective of the
transformation process in the United Kingdom involves the complete privatization of
public extension organizati,on.
In this Chapter the case of the United Kingdom is analyzed under the scenario of




it difficult to collect information concerning the transformation process in the UK since
much of the information required was considered confidential and could not be released.
Results of the Survey
Information Regarding Hypothesis 1
The number of farmers in total reached by ADAS services was 27,000 or W%
of the total number of farmers in the country. These farmers were considered as clients
of the ADAS. The total number of farmers that were in contact with ADAS reaches
81,000. The data for different categories (small, medium, large) of farmers were not
available. Since the introduction of the cost recovery to present there was a slight
increase in the total number of farmers in the client category.
Based on the results of the survey it can be stated that the coverage of ADAS in
general was in low levels. Also, the fact that there were 100,000 small farmers in the
country, wh ile the total number of farmers reached was only 27,000 supports the first
hypothesis that the needs of the small farmers will be neglected to a great extent. Even
though the data about private provision of agricultural extension were not available,
based on literature discussed in Chapter 2, it is expected private providers work more
with large and medium farmers. In addition, as noted earlier in the literature review,
this is true even for the public agricultural extension. Based on the survey, there has
been a slight increase in the total of clients of the ADAS. Even though data for each
category of farmers are not available, it is expected based on literature and theory




Information Regarding Hypothesis 2 and 3
Concerning the services provided, there has been no change in the package of
services offered to farmers. The difference was that services were being provided in a
more personalized basis. Regarding the structural changes in the market for agricultural
extension services, this information was not provided. Since the information about the
two areas 1) services provided and 2) structure of the market for agricultural extension,
was not available, an analysis of these areas can not be done.
The information regarding fees charged for the services was considered
confidential and was not available. Fee rates depended on the demand for these services.
A general formula for deciding the rates was: "The consultant's costs of salary in
addition to 2.2 times other costs have to be met from fee rate". At present, fees are
charged at full economic recovery rate.
Additional Information
The current number of personnel working for ADAS is 1,500. Also the current
expenses of ADAS reach £80 million. These expenses are fully recovered from service
fees. There are no longer subsidies from government. One aspect of cost-recovery
approach indicated in the response was that it makes it possible to identify costs of and
revenues from providing services for which a fee can be charged.
ADAS (public agricultural extension) is on the verge of privatization and so
information regarding hypotheses two and three was considered confidential. For this
reason, this information was not made available to this research. The unwillingness of
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ADAS to provide this information is an indicator of the reduction of access to
information (regarding research, policy issues, etc.) as, in this case, the privatization of
the public agricultural extension takes place. The case of the United Kingdom represents
a case not hospitable to the inquiry as discussed in Chapter 4, which results in limited
information available for this case. This limitation was not anticipated at the beginning
of the research, compared to other limitations noted in Chapter 4, since at that time the
move toward privatization had not started.
Commercial ization
Commercialization is the change from providing a free public service financed by
government to a commercial operation financed by user charges. The commercialization
approach was used in New Zealand and the Tasmanian state of Austral ia. The
agricultural extension organization for the state of Tasmania was contacted, but the
required information was not possible to collect. An analysis of the New Zealand's case
follows.
New Zealand's Case
The agricultural sector in New Zealand employs 10.5 %of working population and
accounts for 7.2 % of the Gross Domestic Product (GOP). The industrial sector accounts
for 21.7% of GOP (United Nations).
In the case of New Zealand, In 1985, the government initiated a program of




agriculture in particular. As part of this program, government introduced a user-pays
philosophy.
Regarding the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (MAF), there would be a
progressive funding reduction over the five-year period 1986-1990, especially in the
divisions of agricultural research, agricultural extension, and media services (the main
discretionary services). The agricultural extension division of MAF, as well as other
divisions, were required to "go commercial" i.e., charge for advisory services provided
to farmers. As a result the MAF found it necessary to restructure itself in four
businesses. One of the four new businesses created was MAFTechnology, which was
responsible for agricultural extension services. MAFTechnology, as the other parts of
MAF, had to find other ways to cover the costs of their services. Under the new
circumstances, their revenues would come from three client groups: the 'public good'
identified by government and represented by the Minister of Agriculture; the agricultural
industries; and the 'private good', problem-solving research and consultancy services to
individual farmers, groups, or firms.
In 1990 the advisory activities were restyled as the Management Consultancy
service and established as a separate business. The service was fully commercialized in
1992 and by 1994 the agency was self-funding. The government then sought to fully
make private the service, which was subsequently sold to Wrightson Ltd., New Zealand's
largest rural input supplier and selling agency. During this time the Management




Results of the Survey
Information Regarding Hypothesis 1
As discussed earlier, an important area to be investigated concerned the extent and
type of clientele reached by agricultural extension services. As a result of
commercialization, ANZ is now dealing with a reduced number of farmers on a much
more in-depth basis. Data about the exact number of farmers being reached were not
available. However, based on the responses of people that answered the questionnaire,
agricultural extension services probably reached about 50 % of active farmers before
commercialization and this may have fallen to around 40% in the present.
The following changes in the type of clientele were noted. Time involved in on-
farm consultancy increased from 25 % to 45 % of total time while education/training
services (providing tutors to academies at "college" level to teach courses 'in agriculture)
increased from 5 % to 15 %. In addition, agribusiness consultancy which was not offered
before commercialization, now accounts for 10% of their time. However, time involved
in the area of technology transfer went from 25 % to 10% of total time, and rural
intelligence collection (mainly financial information collected from farmers for policy
purposes) dec! ined from 45 % to 20 %.
As a result of the commercialization, the number of farmers reached by the
agricultural extension services was decreased by 20 %. The agricultural extension
services before commercialization reached 50% of the farmers. At the present this figure






of 80,400, 42,500 or about 53 % are small farmers. Given the tendency of public
agricultural extension systems to work more with large and medium farmers, the
coverage level (50 %) and the high percentage of small farmers (53 %), it could be
implied that only a small portion of small farmers were reached before
commercialization. With the commercialization of the public agricultural extension
services, the number of small farmers reached is expected to decrease even more.
Looking at the coverage level after commercialization, the facts support the hypothesis
that the number of small farmers reached will be reduced. This is also confirmed by
looking at the changes in types of clientele of the agricultural extension organization.
As a result of commercialization there was an increase in the commercial segment of
clientele and a decrease in the type of clientele seeking services of the kind of public
good. In addition, the number of agricultural extension personnel was reduced to 100
agents compared to 310 before commercial ization, even though half of th i.s reduction was
offset by the increase in the agricultural extension personnel employed by the private
sector. This reduction and also the change from a group agricultural extension activity
to a more in-depth individual farmer consultancy work, imply that the problem of
coverage was more acute than before the commercialization.
Information Regarding Hypothesis 2
Concerning the servIces provided, prior to commercialization the MAF
agricultural extension service mainly concentrated on group agricultural extension





contact with agribusiness. At the present, there are many farmers receiving in-depth
consultancy services. Also a number of very effective agricultural extension programs
for commercial companies and joint projects between the government funded Foundation
for Research, Science and Technology and agribusinesses are carried out. The later
programs and projects were initiated after the commercialization process began.
More specifically, the services provided from the advisory services before the
commercialization included: 1) phytosanitary inspection, 2) seed inspection. 3) farm
budgeting, 4) home science, 5) farm level experiments, 6) youth training, 7) boys and
girls clubs, 8) cost-benefit analysis, 9) machinery advice, 10) wool handling advice, 11)
soil conservation services, 12) group advisory work, 13) radio preparation, 14) field
days, 15) farm management surveys, 16) rural credit surveys, 17) answers to
parliamentary questions, 18) advice on rural subdivision, and 19) advice on policy
questions.
During the commercialization process, two more servIces were added: 1)
agribusiness consulting, and 2) education and training. Meanwhile, most of the services
from the above package are no longer provided. The services still provided are: I) farm
budgeting, 2) cost-benefit analysis, 3) radio preparation, 4) farm management surveys,
5) answers to parliamentary questions, 6) advice on rural subdivision, and 7) advice on





SERVICES PROVIDED BY AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION IN NEW ZEALAND
Services Provided by Before Cost- Present
Agricultural Extension recovery (1996)
(1984)
Phytosanitary inspection Yes No
Seed inspection Yes No
Farm budgeting Yes Yes
Home science Yes No
Farm level experiments Yes No
Youth training Yes No
Boys and girls clubs Yes No
Cost-benefit analysis Yes Yes
Machinery advice Yes No
Wool handling advice Yes No
Soil conservation services Yes No
Group advisory work Yes No
Radio preparation Yes Yes
Field days Yes No
Farm management surveys Yes Yes
Rural credit surveYs Yes No
Answers to parliamentary questions Yes Yes
Advice on rural subdivision Yes Yes
Advice on policy questions Yes Yes
Agribusiness consulting No Yes
Education and training No Yes
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Commercialization of public agricultural extension resulted in the reduction of
dissemination of the public-good type of agricultural information. Services of public
good nature like phytosanitary and seed inspection, home science and youth training,
machinery advice and soil conservation, and group work were no longer provided.
Instead, new services were added into the package of services provided by the
commercialized agricultural extension like agribusiness consulting, and education and
training. Meanwhile, services of a more private-good nature like farm budgeting, cost
benefit analysis, and farm management were still provided and increased in relative
importance. Changes in the package of services provided again reflect changes in the
type of clientele for agricultural extension, as the move toward commercialization takes
place.
Fees for the services provided were not charged on a per service basis but, rather
in nearly all instances, they were based on the estimate of the time taken to deliver the
servlce. In other words, services were based on an hourly charge rate. Rates for
qualified agricultural consultants were about $NZ 600-1,000 per day.
Information Regarding Hypothesis 3
In addition to the areas noted so far, the effect of the commercialization on the
rest of the private providers of agricultural extension services was investigated (Table
10). Before commercialization, the biggest private provider of agricultural extension
were the agricultural input suppliers with more than a 100 firms and with 35 % of the
market. Even though the agricultural input suppliers maintained their share of the market
ii3
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for the first year after the commercialization, in the present, they represent only 28 % of
the private market of agricultural extension, a loss of 7 % of the market share. The
market share of three other types of private providers followed the same direction.
Agro-processors, with more than 30 firms in the market, in the present, capture 11 % of
the market compared to 12 % before commercialization. Also the market share of the
agro-marketing firms, with 6 firms in the market, declined to 14 % from 15 % before
commercial ization. Finally, non-governmental organizations (7 of them) lost 4 % of their
market share, from 12 % to 8 %. The market share lost by the three types of private
providers was fully captured by the consulting firms. The market share of the consulting
firms was increased from 24% before commercialization to 37% in the present. Also
important to mention is the fact that the number of the consulting firms doubled from
more than 50 to more than 100 during the period under investigation. Finally, the six
farmers' organizations maintained a constant share of the market at 2 % throughout the
period concerned by this research.
Commercialization of the public agricultural extension affected the structure of
and competition in the private market for agricultural extension services. As expected,
there was an increase of the number of private firms providing consultancy services and
also an increase on the share of the market of consulting firms. This increased the
competition between the already existing private consultants and now-commercialized
public consultants, as well as the competition with the other private providers in the
market. An important aspect to be noted about the effect of the commercial ization in the
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structure and degree of competition in the market for agricultural extension, was the
decrease of the market share for most of the pre-existing private providers.
TABLE X
STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN THE MARKET FOR PRIVATE
AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION IN NEW ZEALAND
Private Number of Companies Market Share (%)
Providers
Before Cost- Present Before Cost- Present
recovery (1984) (1996) recovery (1984) (1996)
Agricultural > 100 > 100 35 28
Input
Suppliers
Agro- >30 >30 12 11
processors
Consulting >50 > 100 24 37
Firms
Agro- >6 6 15 14
marketing
Firms
Farmer 6 6 2 2
Organizations
NGOs >7 7 12 8
Additional Information
In addition to the market share, changes also happened to the number of personnel
engaged in agricultural extension work and the rel.ated expense of the private sector in
providing agricultural extension before and after commercialization. The number of
personnel for the private sector as a total, between the two periods increased from 425
to 545, with biggest increase occurring in the consulting firms from 100 to 200. The
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agro-processors (from 50 to 60) and the agro-marketing firms (for 65 to 75) accounted
for the remaining increase. The agricultural input suppliers maintained a constant
number of personnel at 150, as well as the farmers' organizations at JO and non-
governmental organizations at 50. Regarding the private sector expenses for providing
agricultural extension services, it was estimated that they were increased from $NZ42
million before commercialization to $NZ60 million in the present. The estimation is
based on the average salary of $NZ50,OOO and the same (equal) overhead cost per
agricultural extension agent before commercialization. After commercialization, there
has been a 10% increase, mostly in salaries, bringing the cost per agricultural extension
agent to an average of $NZI1O,OOO. It was also indicated in the survey responses that
commercialization of public agricultural extension has resulted in more efficient provision
of the services of a private-good nature.
The number of agricultural extension personnel for the commercialized public
agricultural extension organization decreased from 310 in 1987 to 250 one year after
commercialization and to 100 in 1996. The government expenditures for agricultural
extension services reduced from $NZ 26 million in 1989 to $NZ 24 million one year
after commercialization and to zero in 1996. In terms of government expenditures for
agricultural extension services as a share of budget for agriculture, the figures were 8.2 %
before commercialization, 8% one year after commercialization, and zero in 1996.
While as a share of total government budget, it changed from 0. 115 % before
commercialization to zero in 1996.
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To analyze the role of the government in the transformation process, policies
introduced during the transformation period were also investigated. These police~
included: 1) removal of subsidy on fertilizer (1985); 2) removal of price supports on
sheep and cattle (1986); 3) removal of favorable tax write-offs (1986); 4) equalization
of farm interest rates with commercial rates introduced (1986); 5) introduction of cost-
recovery for advisory, research, animal health and quarantine services (1986); 6) removal
of wheat marketing regulations (1987); 7) removal of liquid milk marketing regulations
(1988); 8) removal of poultry marketing regulations (1988); 9) full cost-recovery for
agricul tural services is introduced (1990); and 10) agricultural science reorganized to
separate profit maki ng institutes (1990).
Government policies implemented during the transformation period tended to
reduce government control in the agricultural sector in two main areas. Several subsidies
including price supports, fertilizer subsidy, and favorable tax write-ofts were removed.
Regulations regarding the marketing of several commodities including wheat. milk, and
poultry were also removed. These policies along with the decision to introduce cost
recovery and later on full cost recovery intended to facilitate the way to
commercialization of the public agricultural extension services.
Finally, concerning the credit for agriculture, presently, credit for agriculture is
available at interest rates similar to those for other economic activities. Prior to 1986,
New Zealand had a state owned rural bank. Government subsidized the interest rates
charged to producers and allowed high ratios of debt to asset value as the bank portfolio
was guaranteed by the government. The first step in reform was to equalize interest
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rates. The second step was to allow commercial debt levels to prevail. The third step
was to sell the rural bank to commercial interests (1990). Hence, credit for the rural
sector is available at the same rates as those for other sectors since 1990.
Privatization
Privatization implies a full transfer of ownership from government to a private
entity, with that entity meeting all costs and receiving any profits. The privatization
approach was followed in the Netherlands. [n addition, France was selected to be studied
under the scenario of privatization. Because of the very limited information collected,
which also did not address the areas investigated by this research, the case of France was
not included in the research. An analysis of the situation in the Netherlands follows.
The Netherlands' Case
The agricultural sector in the Netherlands employs 3.9 % of working population
and accounts for 3.6% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The industrial sector
accounts for 22.8% of GOP (United Nations).
In the Netherlands, privatization process began in January 1990. Under this
process, the transfer of the responsibility and funding from the public to the private
sector was limited to about half of the staff of the agricultural advisory services and the
other half still budgeted and managed by the Ministry of Agriculture. The privatization
approach followed by the Dutch was that of a gradual privatization. The transfer mostly
involved field agents of the agricultural extension service. Research services and
118
regional coordinating services between research and agricultural extension continued to
be controlled by government and to provide free services. More recently, the
Netherlands has shifted all authority for agricultural extension to a private company, the
DLV (Dienst Landbouwvoorlichting or the Agricultural Advisory Service).
Results of the Survey
Information Regarding Hypothesis 1
The data about the number of farmers for each category reached by agricultural
extension services were not available. However, one aspect regarding the extent and
type of clientele reached can be discussed. According to the survey, since the
privatization more "viable" farmers were being reached. Also, there has been a change
from the group approach of the work to a more individual approach of work. These two
changes mean that, consistent with literature and theory discussion in Chapters 2 and 3,
private agricultural extension was working mainly with large farmers. The reason for
this involve the greater demand by this farmer category for such services and their
greater potential for success and thus an ensured demand. In addition, farmers in this
category have the needed resources to require these services provided in a more
individual basis.
Information Regarding Hypothesis 2
Regarding the services offered by agricultural extension before privatization,
services provided concerned explanation and defense of the policies of the Ministry of
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Agriculture (MoA). During the period investigated, services providing information about
consequences of the MoA's policies were removed. In the same time, services regarding
building/construction drawings and meteorologic information were added. While there
have not been many changes in the services provided, changes have occurred in other
areas. These areas included: 1) the ways of presenting the services; 2) the result(ing)
commitment of the advisors; and 3) the attitude of the advisors. In addition, there has
been a shift of group-approach towards more individual approach of clients.
Before privatization all services were provided for free. After privatization, more
and more services were offered as "advisory products". For each "advisory product" the
price depended on the amount of time that is needed. In average, one hour cost DFC
135 up to DFC 175.
Regarding the services provided, with the privatization of the public agricultural
extension, services concerning information about the policies of the public sector were
no longer provided. The reason being that these services involve agricultural information
of the public good nature. Since the benefits from providing these services are difficult
to capture, private agricultural extension will not provide such services. In addition, new
services for which a fee can be charged were added into the package of services
provided.
Information Regarding Hypothesis 3
Complete information concerning the structure and degree of competition in the
market for agricultural extension was not available. However, the degree of competition
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was different depending on the sector. In horticulture, for example, the privatized
agricultural extension faced heavy competition from private consultants already in the
market. While regarding the dairy industry, there was practically no competition from
the private consultants. In this sector the main competitors were the feedmills.
Information about the market for agricultural extension services showed increased
competition in this market as a result of the privatization. The presence of well
developed consulting firms in the sector of horticulture was an indicator of the high
degree of commercial ization in this sector. These private consultants provided a heavy
competition for the privatized (public) agricultural extension entering this market.
Increased competition resulted also in the dairy sector, but the competitor was another
segment of the private providers, the agricultural input suppliers, respectively, the
feedmills.
Additional Information
The number of agricultural extension personnel has changed from 600 one year
before privatization to 700 one year after privatization and to 750 at present.
Meanwhile, the proportion of the DLV budget provided by the government was reduced
from DFC 75 million before privatization to DFC 25 million for 1997.
As in the case of the United Kingdom, information collected for the case of the
Netherlands was limited. This was another indicator of the unwillingness of the private
sector in sharing information.
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Summary
This chapter analyzed information collected from the country cases selected for
this research. The analysis of each country case was conducted based on the three
hypotheses stated in Chapter 3. First the information for each country was presented and
then interpreted. Countries were grouped based on the transformation approach
implemented in the country. For some of the country cases where the public agricultural
extension was on the verge of privatization or already privatized, a lack of willingness
to provide the required information was noted. This resulted in limited information






This research, as discussed in Chapter 3, investigated the changes in three
important areas: 1) the extent and type of clientele reached by agricultural extension
services, 2) the kind of agricultural information provided to farmers, and 3) the structure
of the market for agricultural extension services. These changes were investigated in the
context of the implementation of the cost-recovery, commercialization and privatization
schemes. Also, the role of the public sector regarding agricultural extension during and
after the implementation of the schemes mentioned above was investigated.
Earlier chapters discussed the current level of investment and the problem of
coverage for agricultural extension worldwide. This problem exists for both developed
and developing countries, while being more acute for the developing countries. It was
estimated that in 1988 more than US$ 6 billion were invested in public agricultural
extension worldwide with an average of about US$ 8,500 per extension worker. Also,
it was estimated that there were more than 600,000 extension personnel worldwide, 95 %
of which were working in public agricultural extension systems. Meanwhile, there were
1.1 billion people economically active in agriculture, or 22 % of world's population. As
a result, only about one-third of agricultural extension's resources were used to serve the
needs of the small and subsistence farmers who make-up more than 75-80% of the
world's farmers.
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Even though there have been different initiatives to resolve the inadequate
resource problems mentioned above, given the problem of coverage level, the investment
and resource allocation for agricultural extension is insufficient. Moreover, the
allocation of resources to public-sector agricultural extension is unlikely to increase
significantly in the near future. Alternative ways and resources need to be identified to
support agricultural extension services to reach the majority of small and resource-poor
farmers.
In addition, the challenges facing agricultural extension as an institution
worldwide and different responses to deal with these challenges were presented. From
a macroeconomic perspective, currently, the global evolution of agricultural extension
is at a critical turning point, an era of uncertainty and change where three main
developments confront agricultural extension internationally: 1) attacks on public sector
agricultural extension by politicians and economists concerned with the costs and
financing of public sector agricultural extension; 2) the controversy of system "model"
preference; and 3) lessons learned, both from the evolution of national systems and from
models and projects developed by international agencies.
In dealing with challenges faced by agricultural extension as an institution
worldwide, different systems have responded in different ways. Some of the public
agricultural extension systems moved toward cost-recovery schemes. Other sought to
commercialize the public agricultural extension organizations. In other countries a more
direct move toward the privatization of the public agricultural extension systems is being
followed. The response of the United States Cooperative Extension System, to the
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current challenges, has been quite different compared to the ways described so far. The
U.S. CES re-grouped, reviewed what was needed, and advanced a new set of issues-
oriented initiatives designed to revitalize the relevance of the system.
However, there are several questionable areas concerning the above changes.
How does the move toward cost-recovery schemes, commercialization, or privatization
affect the extent and type of clientele reached by agricultural extension services? Are the
needs of the small farmers going to be fulfilled by the new commercial, or private type
of agricultural extension organization? What will happen to the "public good" part of
agricultural information? Who will be responsible for its dissemination? How about the
type of services that farmers will require by agricultural extension service, now that they
have to pay for them? How do changes affect existing private providers? This research
has intended to answer these questions and other related issues.
The previous chapter presented the results of the survey for each country-case for
the three scenarios investigated: cost recovery, commercialization, and privatization. The
conclusions based on interpretations of these results wiH be presented in the following
section. Each of the hypotheses stated in Chapter 3, will be discussed following the
same pattern as the presentation of the results.
Conclusions Regarding Hypothesis I
In earlier chapters it was discussed that even public agricultural extension services
are biased toward larger and more commercial farmers, with the small farmers being the
most neglected category. In addition, it was concluded that the demand for "fee for
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service" agricultural extension would mostly emanate from middle and large farmers,
while small farmers would tend to be neglected by the private sector because of small
or absence of demand. Based on the above, it can be concluded that the transfer of the
responsibility and/or resources for agricultural extension from the public sector to the
private sector, through privatization of publ ic agricultural extension services, is not going
to increase the coverage level of the agricultural extension services. On the contrary, the
coverage level is expected to decrease in general, and particularly with regard to small
farmers. This is also true in the cases of commercialization and cost recovery where the
public sector still retains the ownership of the agricultural extension services. In the case
of cost recovery, especially if the private sector involvement in the provision of
agricultural extension services is an infant industry, the introduction of fees for several
services may result in an increase in the number of large farmers reached by agricultural
extension services. This for the simple reason that these farmers have the resources to
pay for the kind of information that helps them to maintain their competitive edge. In
the meantime, the increased demand for public services from the large farmers, given
that the provision of such services is not increased, will result particularly in a lower
fulfillment of the small farmers needs.
Cost-recovery
In Mexico the objectives of cost recovery were to reduce the cost of public sector
regarding provision of agricultural extension services and gradually transfer large, more
commercial farmers to the private sector. At the same time, introduction of fees was
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intended to serve as an incentive for greater involvement of private providers of
agricultural extension. In Ireland, the original objective of the cost recovery attempt was
to reduce the cost of the publ ic agricultural extension to the taxpayer and at the same
time ensure that farmers who benefitted from the service contributed to the cost of
providing the service. In the United Kingdom the original objective of the cost recovery
attempt was to reduce the cost of the public agricultural extension and at the same time
to make ADAS more responsive to farmer needs.
Looking at the results of the survey for the three countries, Mexico, Ireland and
the United Kingdom, a similar trend is the general reduction of the number of farmers
reached by agricultural extension services. Based on this, it can be concluded that the
cost recovery attempt does not help increase the coverage of public agricultural
extension.
In addition to the total number of farmers, changes in the categories of small,
medium and large farmers are investigated. These data were available only for Mexico
and Ireland. In the case of Mexico there was a reduction in the number of farmers for
three categories reached by public agricultural extension. The reduction of the number
of large farmers in this case was consistent with one of tne objectives of the cost
recovery attempt, shifting of the larger farmers to the private sector agricultural
extension. In the case of Ireland the number of smaJi farmers was reduced while the
number of medium and large farmers was increased. The results from Mexico and
Ireland support the hypothesis of this research that the introduction of fees will result in
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a reduction of the number of the small farmers being reached by agricultural extension
services.
Commercial ization
Agriculture in New Zealand is commercialized to a great extent with a major part
of the industry oriented toward export production. The highly commercialized
agriculture was given as one of the determinants in the commercialization of the
agricultural extension services. The original objective of the commercialization of the
agricultural extension services was about fiscal savings, based on the argument that there
is no justification for taxpayer input into a service aimed directly at one sector of the
economy, as well as reduced government intervention in agriculture. The following
conclusions can be drawn by looking at the results of the move toward commercial ization
in the case of New Zealand.
First, as a result of commercialization, ANZ is now dealing with a reduced
number of farmers on a much more in-depth bas~s. Second, by looking at the changes
in the extent and type of clientele, it can be concluded that the access of the small
farmers to agricultural extension services is decreased and limited.
Privatization
For the case of the Netherlands, the data about the number of farmers for each
category reached by agricultural extension services and their respective changes were not
available. However, in Chapter 3 it was noted that theory suggests that the demand for
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"fee for service" agricultural extension will mostly emanate from middle and large
farmers, while small farmers will tend to be neglected by the private sector because of
small or absence of effective demand. In addition, according to the Netherlands'
response to the survey, the privatized agricultural extension services were working
mostly with more "viable" farmers on a more individual approach of work. The above
supports the hypothesis that with the privatization of public agricultural extension, the
access of small farmers to agricultural extension services will be limited.
Conclusions Regarding Hypothesis 2
Another aspect investigated in this research concerns the changes in the type of
services provided by agricultural extension as cost-recovery, commercialization or
privatization schemes are being implemented. In the case of cost recovery where the
service remains public, few changes are expected in the package of services provided.
However, based on the results of this research, it can be concluded that there was
increased emphasis on the type of services for which a fee can be charged. Important
changes in the package of the services provided happen in the case of commercial ization
and privatization. Chapter 3 discussed the classification of the agricultural information
into different categories ranging from pure-publ ie-good to pure-private-good i.nformation
and some mixed categories in between. Also, the theory suggests that private providers
of agricultural extension will not provide the type of services of the public good nature
since they simply cannot capture the benefits from providing these type of services.
Thus, under complete commercialization or privatization of the public agricultural
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extension services, it is expected that the services of the public-good nature will no
longer provided or will be provided at a very limited extent.
Cost-recovery
Information about changes in the package of services provided by agricultural
extension services was available only for the cases of Mexico and Ireland. (n both cases
it was noted that new services were added since the start of the cost recovery. The
added services were services for which a fee can be charged. [n the case of Ireland,
increased revenues from fees charged for some services indicate the growing emphasis
on those services. In addition, the adding of the new services happens at the same time
that there was a reduction in agricultural extension personnel and expenditure by the
public sector means that existing services will be diminished in importance. This was
confirmed in both cases, where a number of services of a public-good nature are no
longer provided. These results support the hypothesis that introduction of fees results
in a reduced provision of public good nature agricultural information.
Commercial ization
In the case of New Zealand, from the original package, only services for which
a fee can be charged were still provided. All services for which a fee could not be
charged (public good agricultural information) were no longer provided. In addition,
new services of a more private good nature were added. These changes support the
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hypothesis that commercialization of public agricultural extension will result in decreased
dissemination of public good type of agricultural information.
Privatization
In the Netherlands, services concerning agricultural information of the public-
good nature were no longer provided. The remaining services were offered as "advisory
products" with their price depending on the time needed to deliver the service. These
changes are consistent with the hypothesis that privatization of public agricultural
extension will result in decreased dissemination of the public good type of agricultural
information. This is also reinforced by the direct indication of not providing data for this
study as it was stated that these kind of information could be sold and was being sold to
other countries in the form of services.
Conclusions Regarding Hypothesis 3
Changes in the structure of the market for agricultural extension services
primarily concern the cases of commercialization and privatization. [n the case of the
cost recovery, especially for developing-country situations, one of the purposes of the
introduction of fees was to serve as an incentive for the development of a private market
for agricultural extension. In such situations, important changes in the structure of the
market for agricultural extension were not expected. In the case of commercialization
or privatization the public providers of the agricultural extension services do not exist any
longer. In such a situation, an increase of the private consulting firms was expected.
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The competition between the public and private providers now changes to competition
between different segments of the private sector. One would expect an increased
competition among the private consulting firms, more specifically between the already
existing private consulting firms providing such services and the now commercialized or
privatized providers. This is based on the assumption that commercialized or privatized
agricultural extension organizations will act as private consulting firms. In addition,
theory suggests that the competition between the consulting firms and other private
providers like input suppliers and processing/marketing firms, will increase as well.
Cost-recovery
Information about the structural changes in the market for agricultural extension
was available for the cases of Mexico and Ireland. For both cases the general trend was
an increased market share of the private sector agricultural extension. Also, the number
of companies and personnel, as well as expenditures of the private sector with regard to
agricultural extension were increased. This trend supports the hypothesis that the
introduction of fees for several services results in an increase of the private sector
involvement in the provision of such services.
Commercial ization
In the case of New Zealand, important structural changes in the private market
for agricultural extension were caused by the move toward commercialization. Market
shares for most of the private providers were reduced. Only the market share of
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consulting firms was increased. Based on the above, it can be concluded that
commercialization of public agricultural extension will result in increased competition in
the private market for agricultural extension services. The increased competition will
result first among the consulting firms between the existing private consulting firms and
the commercialized public agricultural extension, which will compete for the same
clientele. In addition, there will be increased competition between the private consulting
firms and other private providers.
Privatization
In the case of the Netherlands, data about structural changes in the market for
agricultural extension services were not available. However, according to the survey
response, the entering of the privatized public agricultural extension in the private market
results in increased competition between the privatized public agricultural extension and
several private providers already in the market.
Summary of Conclusions for the Three Hypothesis
Hypothesis 1
The attempts of cost recovery, commercialization, and privatization result in the
reduction of the total number of farmers reached by agricultural extension. The biggest
reduction for the three scenarios results in the category of small farmers.
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Hypothesis 2
The attempts of cost recovery, commercialization, and privatization result in a
reduced provision of the agricultural information of a public-good nature. In the case
of commercialization and privatization, this type of agricultural information will be
provided only through contracting between the government and commercial and/or
private agricultural extension.
Hypothesis 3
The attempts of cost recovery, commercialization, and privatization bring
structural changes in the market for agricultural extension. The cost recovery attempt
results in a greater private sector involvement in providing agricultural extension
services. In the case of commercialization and privatization, these structural changes
result in increased competition between private providers of agricultural extension.
Impl ications of this Research
Several implications can be derived based on the results of this research.
Implications are presented separately for the developing and developed countries.
Implications for the U.S. are also presented.
Implications for the Developing Countries
In the developing countries the number of small farmers consists of a large
percentage of the total number of farmers. Chapter 2 discussed that the problem of
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coverage level faced by agricultural extension in these countries. In addition, earlier in
the chapter it was indicated that as a result of the cost recovery, commercialization, and
privatization schemes, the level of coverage of agricultural extension services decreases,
with the biggest reduction being in the category of small farmers. Thus, this is an
important area that the public sector in the developing countries needs to address. The
increased coverage could result if revenues generated from fees charged for services
provided are used to serve the needs of additional farmers especially small and
subsistence farmers. This requires in the first place a greater commitment, or at least
to maintain the same level, of investment of the public sector in agricultural extension.
In addition, with the consolidation of private agricultural extension, the large, more
commercial farmers willing to pay for the services they require can be gradually
transferred to the private sector. This will free up human and financial resources of the
public sector that can be used to better address the needs of less wealthy farmers.
In regard to commercialization and/or privatization of public agricultural
extension, this obviously is not a recommended approach for developing countries. First,
private provision of agricultural extension services is for most of these countries an infant
industry. This is also related with a less developed effective demand for services for
which a fee can be charged. Second, it was discussed in this chapter that the
commercialization and privatization approaches result in a reduced dissemination of the
public good type of agricultural information. The reduced availability of information and
inability of prices and costs to capture essential parts of the decision process could result
in less than efficient resource allocation. This inefficient resource allocation along with
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a decreased coverage level could inhibit (constrain) rural development and result in a loss
to the whole society.
Thus, for the case of developing countries, one of the tasks of the public sector
is monitoring resource allocation with regard to agricultural extension resulting from
private markets. However, the most important task is the creation by pubJic sector of
resources for allocation and direct participation in the allocation of the resources for
agricultural extension.
Implications for the Developed Countries
In developed countries, similarly as for the developing countries, cost recovery,
commercialization and privatization result in a decreased coverage level of agricultural
extension, with the biggest reduction in the category of small farmers. Also, earlier in
the chapter it was indicated that in the case of commercialization and privatization,
services of the public-good nature were no longer provided. Based on these conclusions,
it can be argued that even in the countries with a highly commercialized agriculture there
is still a need for public intervention with regard to agricultural extension. Besides the
more traditional aspects of technology transfer, there are other important issues that
private agricultural extension does not address like rural health, resource conservation,
food safety, and environmental protection. In addition, the public sector provides an
unbiased source where farmers can validate the information provided to them by the
private sector. Also, there is a need for the public sector to fulfill the information gap
for areas like research and policy. Limited information was possible to collect for
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several countries included in this research where the agricultural extension was in the
process of privatization. This is an indicator that the process of privatization is
accompanied by reduced access to information for several public purposes.
Theory and survey responses indicate that commercialization and privatization of
public agricultural extension result in more efficient provision of the services of a
private-good nature. In addition, introduction of fees for services makes it possible to
identify costs of and revenues from providing these services.
With regard to farmers, commercialization and/or privatization of public
agricultural extension results in more direct work on an individual basis with farmers,
especially large farmers. Another implication for farmers is the greater costs for the
services they use. The increased costs for agricultural extension services and the
reduction in publ ic provision of these services could affect the success rate among new
farmers.
For private providers, the above transformation of public agricultural extension
to commercialization or privatization will result in an increased competition for clientele.
Important changes happen in the structure of the private market for agricultural extension
services as the commercialized/privatized public agricultural extension enters this market.
Implications for the United States
The U.S. CES move to a broader issue-oriented approach increased the relative
amount of services of a public good nature. This, at a time of flat budgets, resulted in
a considerable change of the relative mix of the services provided. Examples are
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increased efforts in environmental area, youth at risk, community development, food
safety, etc. This approach has already reduced coverage level among farmers. In
addition, there are fewer direct benefits to farmers who also make up a smaller group
than historically. Thus, for the U.S., the commercialization and/or privatization of
agricultural extension would involve only the part of the system that concerns the
provision of a more private nature services. Implications of such moves regarding
agricultural policy, farmers, and private market for agricultural extension services are
presented.
Food production and export have been traditionally important policy tools of
government. Commercialization and/or privatization of publ ic agricultural extension by
reducing the availability of information directed at public policy would make it difficult
for the government to continue to use these tools. In addition, information programs
directed at public policy changes would be unlikely.
The move to commercialization and/or privatization of public agricultural
extension would result in the loss of the validation of information provided to farmers
by private sources. With a highly developed private agricultural extension this could be
costly to efficiency.
As it was noted above, the private sector of agricultural extension is rather highly
developed in the U.S.. Commercialization and/or privatization of public agricultural
extension could cause considerable adjustment in the private market. Another issue for
the U.S. situation involves the different organizational levels of agricultural extension:
federal, state, and local. A decision to move toward commercial ization and/or
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privatization of public agricultural extension could involve conflicting interests of
different levels with regard to such move.
Summary and Recommendations for Future Research
This chapter drew conclusions from the results discussed in Chapter 5.
Conclusions were drawn for the three hypotheses stated in Chapter 3. For each
hypothesis, separate conclusions were stated for the cases of cost-recovery,
commercialization, and privatization. In addition, general conclusions for each
hypothesis were stated.
This chapter also discussed implications resulting from this research. Implications
were presented for both developing and developed countries. Implications for the U.S.
were also presented.
Based on the results presented and conclusions derived by this research, several
recommendations for future research can be suggested. First, from the information
collected for this research, it was not possible to assess if there are any qualitative
differences in the services provided by publ ic and commercial/private agricultural
extension. Future work in this area could help policy decisions regarding the
commercialization and/or privatization of agricultural extens ion.
Second, more work is needed to analyze factors determining the demand for and
supply of "fee for service" agricultural extension. Resource and time limitations did not
allow for a collection of annual data for country cases included in this research. Such
information would allow for more in depth analysis of factors affecting the decisions
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regarding the commercialization and/or privatization of agricultural extension. In
addition, statistical procedures can be used to test the significance of these factors and
the hypotheses stated in this research as well.
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- Please state the year commercialization started:
- Classification Definitions: Please provide the classification used in your




A. - Total number of fanns in the categories small, medium, and large farms
according to the classification dermed above;

















B - Type of clientele reached (using same classification definitions as in part A)
including changes in clientele as a result of commercialization;

















C - Type of services provided from the advisory services (including changes in
services provided by public sector before the move toward commercialization
and also new services added during the commercialization);






















2 NEW SERVICES ADDED DURING THE COMMERCIALIZATION:











3 SERVICES THAT ARE NO LONGER PROVIDED AS A RESULT OF COMMERCIALIZATION:












D - Fees charged for the services offered by advisory services and changes (if
any) of those fees since the start of commercialization; (Please Note If Using
Local Currency Or U8$)
FEES CHARGED FOR THE SERVICES OFFERED:





















2 FEES CHARGED FOR NEW SERVICES ADDED DURING THE COMMERCIALIZATION:













3 CHANGES IN FEES LISTED IN PART 01:
(PLEASE LIST THE YEAR THE NEW FEE WAS INTRODUCED





















4 CHANGES IN FEES LISTED IN PART D2:
(PLEASE LIST THE YEAR THE NEW FEE WAS INTRODUCED;












E - Degree of competition in advisory services market. Please provide the
number of companies for each of the industries listed below. Also, please
indicate the share of the market for each industry, expressed as a percentage
of the total market for all industries listed below taken together (if the share
of the market cannot be evaluated, please provide the best possible estimate





1) Agricultural Input Industry
2} Processing Industry
3} Pure Consulting Industry
4) Farol Commodity Marketing Industry
5) Fanners' Organizations/Associatiolls/Unions
6) Non-Governmental Organizations
2. 1 YEAR AFTER COMMERCIALIZATION
1) Agricultural Input Industry
2) Processing Industry
3) Pure Consulting Industry




1) Agricultural Input Industry
2) Processing Industry
3) Pure Consulting Industry






F - Total number of advisory services personnel of the public sector and also
changes in this number since the introduction of commercialization;
- NUMBER OF ADVISORY SERVICES PERSONNEL:
1. Total Before Commercialization
2. 1 Year After Commercialization
3. Present
G - Public cost of providing advisory services and changes after the start of
commercialization (indicators like public budget allocations for providing
advisory services as a total and as share of budget agriculture allocations or
total public expenditures can be used); [please Note If Using Local Currency
Or US$]
- GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES FOR PROVIDING ADVISORY SERVICES AS A TOTAL:
l. Total Before Commercialization
2. 1 Year After Commercialization
3. Present
- GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES FOR PROVIDING ADVISORY SERVICES AS A SHARE OF
BUDGET FOR AGRICULTURE:
I. Total Before Commercialization
2. 1 Year After Commercialization
3. Present
- GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES FOR PROVIDING ADVISORY SERVICES AS A SHARE
OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET:
1. Total Before Commercialization
2. 1 Year After Commercialization
3. Present
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H - Government policies related to agriculture implemented (if any) since the
start of commercialization including policies like: input and output price,
regulatory, trade, monetary, exchange rate, fIScal and also technology policy












I - Please provide an indication of private provision (other than commercialized
public-sector) of agricultural Extension service (if an exact estimate cannot be
provided, please provide the best possible estimate based on your
observations/experiences). One (if possible, both) of the following indicators
can be used:
- PRIVATE EXPENSES IN PROVIDING AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION SERVICES:
1. Before Commercialization
2. 1 Year After Commercialization
3. Present
- NUMBER OF PRIVATE EXTENSION PERSONNEL:
1. Before Commercialization




J - Type of agriculture product: high vs. low value commodities;
- High value commodities' share of agricultural production
- Low value commodities' share of agricultural production
K - Access to credit;
- IS THERE AVAILABLE CREDIT FOR AGRICULTURE AT INTEREST RATES SIMILAR TO
THOSE FOR OTHER INDUSTRIES IN YOUR COUNTRY?
-
YES NO
- HAS THIS CHANGED SINCE THE INTRODUCTION OF COMMERCIALIZATION? PLEASE
INCLUDE AN EXPLANAnON.
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L - Please state the original objective of the commercialization movement and any
changes in this objective as the implementation process took place.
M - Please share any observations you have as to the process your organization
has gone through as well as the positive and negative aspects resulting from
the change.
N - Please send any studies, papers, or reports relative to the organization's
change that you believe would be useful in our research.
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